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Feminists as Collaborators and Prostitutes as 
Autobiographers: De-Constructing An Inclusive 
Yet Political Feminist Jurisprudence 
. * Cynthla Chandler 
The goal of this Article is to respond to the contemporary 
disintegration of a unified and politically powerful feminist movement. 
Since the late 1970s, an anti-essentialist critique of the feminist movement 
has developed, whereby many women of color, of less-privileged 
socioeconomic classes and of other disenfranchised commumtIes 
righteously criticized "feminism" as being focused on the experiences and 
concerns of white women of middle- to upper-class privilege to the 
exclusion of other women's stories. 1 This anti-essentialism critique has led 
to a backlash against the idea that there is one unified feminist community.2 
Moreover, because these disenfranchised women were excluded from the 
feminist community, it creates a misconception of feminism as a 
philosophy not concerned with addressing the complexities of women's 
*Ms. Chandler is the Founder and Director of the Women's Positive Legal Action Network, 
Oakland, California. She has her B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley, 
M.Phil. in Criminology from the University of Cambridge, England and a J.D. from Harvard 
Law School. The author has done extensive work with prisoners' and prostitutes' rights 
organizations. 
1. The beginning of the essentialist feminist critique is commonly associated with the 
1977 Combahee River Collective's "Black Feminist Statement." See DAPHNE PATAl & 
NORETTA KOERTGE, PROFESSING FEMINISM: CAUTIONARY TALES FROM THE STRANGE 
WORLD OF WOMEN'S STUDIES 59-60 (1994). Since its issuance, numerous writings 
critiquing "white" feminism's exclusion of the voices of women of color, lesbians and other 
disenfranchised groups have emerged in feminist literature. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, 
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585 (1990) 
(defining essentialism within contemporary feminism and developing a race-based anti-
essentialist critique of Catharine MacKinnon's work); Adrienne Rich, Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631, 632 ( 1980) (critiquing the invisibility 
of the lesbian experience in feminist theory). 
2. See Harris, supra note 1, at 585 (arguing feminist methodology should challenge its 
tendency to privilege a unitary voice). 
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lives. 3 This notion has matured in academic, professional, activist and 
grassroots communities alike, resulting in a less visible and cohesively self-
defined feminist community, along with efforts to re-cohere or resist the 
dismantling of "feminism.,,4 
While in some circumstances this perception of exclusion from 
feminism leads members of feminist-outcast communities to actively work 
to reclaim and redefine the terms "feminist" and "feminism,"s other women 
simply reject these terms and no longer identify themselves as feminist or 
as part of a women's community. 6 This Article is written from the former 
perspective, with the concern that unless a more inclusive, yet 
simultaneously politically powerful, feminist jurisprudence is created it will 
lack a politically significant mass and may even eventually fail to exist-
leaving no political body to work to protect the gains won for women 
through the feminist movement over the last thirty years? 
In this Article, I present a deconstructionalist analysis of the feminist 
debates regarding prostitution, pornography and sexuality as a stage for 
describing one solution for creating a politically powerful and inclusive 
feminist jurisprudence. I argue that the feminist movement would be better 
served if feminists simultaneously sought to achieve two goals: 1) 
acknowledging and working against their own acts of exclusion of women; 
and 2) shifting the focus of feminist jurisprudence away from the 
contemporary foci on either women's liberty and choices or the dominating 
constraints on women's lives, to looking at the intersection of both agency 
and domination on their lives in order to develop methods of reducing 
3. See Ginia Bellafante, Feminism It's All About Me, TIME MAG., June 29, 1998, at 54, 
58-59 (60-70% of women polled answered "no" to the question, "Do you consider yourself 
to be a feminist?"; only 28% of women polled answered "yes" to the question, "Is feminism 
relevant to you personally?"). 
4. See Harris, supra note 1, at 606-07 (citing efforts by Harvard Law School professor 
Martha Minow to maintain unifying categories of women in order to maintain a feminist 
political force). 
5. See, e.g., Nina Hartley, Confessions of a Feminist Porno Star, in SEX WORK: 
WRITINGS By WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 142 (Frederique Delacoste & Priscilla 
Alexander eds., 1987) [hereinafter SEX WORK] (Porn "Star" Nina Hartley insists that she is a 
feminist and that her work in pornography personifies her feminist goals and philosophy. 
She claims for herself the title "feminist" despite her perception that other feminists would 
not consider her a feminist). 
6. See Bellafante, supra note 3, at 58-59. On a personal note, on September 11, 1998, I 
attended a colloquium at American University, Washington College of Law on anti-racist 
responses to sexist violence. The academic participants in the colloquium were chosen for 
their concern with women's rights and either domestic violence or incarceration issues. We 
discussed the merits of using the rhetoric "anti-sexist community" rather than "feminist 
community" in order to appear more united and anti-racist in philosophy-thus rejecting 
rather than redefining the term "feminist." The use of this terminology is currently being 
developed by Professor Adrienne Davis, American University, Washington College of Law. 
7. Cf PATAI & KOERTGE, supra note 1, at 195 (arguing that the narrow definition of 
acceptable feminism is politically self-destructive because it will eventually "drive away 
those who are negatively categorized, and this reduces the group's numbers and alienates 
potential supporters"). 
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women's daily suffering. 
Through the lens of the feminist pornography debate, Section I of this 
Article discusses how the knowledge gained and arguments made by 
contemporary feminists through listening and revocalizing women's voices 
are not innocent, truthful and free of exclusionary power. Contemporary 
feminists' rhetoric of "truth"-of claiming to be descriptive and presenting 
women's reality-is produced by and reflects power differentials between 
women, as well as between women and men. Rather than increasing the 
choices and availability of persuasive strategies for feminists, this rhetoric 
of truth constrains feminist jurisprudence into falsely dichotomous schools 
of thought which focus either on women's liberty and choices (choice 
feminism) or the constraints of a male dominated society on women's lives 
(constraint feminism). Moreover, these schools of thought serve not to 
politically strengthen the feminist movement, but to divide and alienate 
many women from it. 
This fIrst section is divided into three parts. It begins by illustrating the 
common themes in contemporary feminist methodology, defining one 
universal theory of women's sexual agency as a "truth" in contemporary 
society, and of labeling criticism as evidence of falsity and therefore 
collaboration in the dominance of women. The section then shifts to 
demonstrate the normative nature of such feminist methodological 
strategies. These strategies simultaneously define the norm of female 
agency and ostracize or make invisible women who do not conform. I 
argue that such feminist tactics, rather than describing women's reality, 
evaluate and choose one version of reality to describe all versions. Such 
feminist schools do not describe, but attempt, and to some degree succeed, 
in constructing female agency. 
Once destabilizing the contemporary feminist description of the "truth" 
of women's agency (or lack thereof), Section I then turns to a discussion of 
the political limitations of such a rhetoric of truth. These limitations are 
illustrated by developing a satirical choice-feminism "truth" argument8 that 
Catharine MacKinnon, a leading constraint-feminist, is a collaborator in the 
oppression of women. This satire demonstrates not merely the non-
truthfulness of such "truth" rhetoric as illustrated through its inability to be 
tested and (ironically) its ability to be used against itself-but also 
highlights the political non-persuasiveness of such rhetoric as it insultingly 
alienates and exercises power to exclude all those who criticize, thus 
dividing feminist support. 
Section II of this Article discusses whether a rhetoric of choice and 
constraint-which is conscious of its non-truth, or non-innocence-and an 
exercise of exclusionary power is any more politically useful than a 
8. By "truth" argument I refer to an argument which claims to speak from the voice of 
one-sided truth in order to exclude opposition. I do not mean to state that the argument to 
follow is factually accurate. 
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rhetoric of either choice or constraint. Through an analysis of 
contemporary prostitutes' autobiographies, the possibility of a more 
inclusive rhetoric of choice within constraint is evaluated. This analysis 
points to the need for feminists to be conscious of their attempts to exclude 
some women's stories to maintain uniformity and solidarity within their 
own jurisprudence. Rather than weakening feminism's political base, such 
consciousness, combined with a desire to maintain true solidarity that does 
not require the exercise of such exclusionary power against fellow women 
and feminists, will enable feminists to create new ways of structuring their 
arguments so as to avoid conflicts between women, thus actually creating a 
more inclusive and powerful feminist political group. Yet in order to create 
these new solutions, I argue that it may be necessary for the focus of 
feminism to shift from issues of female freedom or limitation, to working 
pragmatically to reduce and alter conditions within which people 
experience oppression. 
Arguing for a shift in focus of feminist jurisprudence raises the 
question of just how far away its focus can shift--can the subject of 
feminist jurisprudence be opened up too far so that there is no longer a 
"feminist" cause? I argue that feminism will not become "relativistic" once 
the use of a rhetoric of truth is rejected. Rather, feminists will always have 
belief structures intact by which they can judge "better" arguments from 
"worse" arguments. However, as feminists, we must work to increase the 
choices for all women, including ourselves. Only by doing so can a theory 
of female sexuality be developed which is both inclusive and which speaks 
to the complexity of gender roles and dominance in society. Yet such work 
to increase choice must be done realistically, with a critical eye toward 
political constraints affecting both women generally and feminists. 
I. 
OPENING THE DOOR TO A FEMINISM OF CHOICE WITHIN 
CONSTRAINT: FEMINISTS AS COLLABORATORS IN 
DIVIDING WOMEN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to discuss rebuilding, or reclaiming, a unified feminist 
movement out of an environment of anti-essentialist critique and rejection 
of a unifying feminist definition,9 it is fIrst necessary to define the current 
status quo of the feminist movement and examine why this status quo has 
succeeded in alienating many women from the feminist community. A 
more inclusive feminism can only be had by destabilizing and exposing the 
9. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7. 
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exclusionary and evaluative judgments made by contemporary feminists. 
In recent years, feminism has been divided between those interested in 
examining the choices, or autonomy and liberty available to women, and 
those focusing on social and economic constraints on their relative 
inautonomy and inability to make choices. 1O At the center of this debate is 
the question of whether a female agency exists free of male domination and 
construction. II 
Perhaps more than in any other discourse, the division between 
feminists focusing either on choice or constraint is clearly evident within 
the feminist pornography debate. Scholars within this field often identify 
with extreme examples of choice or constraint feminism. 12 Moreover, 
those who do not identify solely with one of these ideological camps-
those who try to lead discussions on women's continuum of agency (or 
choice) within systems of oppression (or constraints) and argue that 
women's lives are more complicated and multifaceted to warrant such 
universal theories of agency-often find their ideas being slotted by others 
into one of these schools or the other, thus denying the complexity of their 
arguments. 13 There appears little choice for the feminist researcher to 
choose how to approach the subject matter outside of a rhetoric of either 
choice or constraint. Interestingly, while women in all areas of the sex 
industry, including those pictured in pornography, have been regularly 
studied and described within contemporary feminism, women in 
pornography are not usually described or self-identifed as feminists. 14 
Therefore, this is also a field in which there is a strong division between the 
feminist and the non-feminist woman. 
Because the pornography debate is an area of study in which feminists 
have been slotted into feminist schools of choice or constraint, and because 
within such debate many of the women purported to be described by 
feminists have been alienated from feminism, the debate provides a useful 
lens through which to examine what has caused the continuing strategic 
divisions between choice and constraint feminists and between feminists 
10. See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 
N.Y.U L. REv. 1559 (1991) (analyzing feminist theory concerning abortion and 
work/family issues, Williams argues that feminist rhetoric has become rutted in 
dichotomous schools of absolute agency or absolute victimization which fail to address the 
complexities of women's experiences). 
11. See id. at 1613, 1615. 
12. This description is modeled after Carole Vance's description of pleasure and danger 
feminists. See Carole S. Vance, Pleasure and Danger: Toward a Politics of Sexuality, in 
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 1 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1992) 
[hereinafter PLEASURE AND DANGER]' 
13. See, e.g., id. at xx-xxi. In PLEASURE AND DANGER, Vance outlines her experience of 
being defined a "pleasure" feminist (or anti-feminist) by "danger" feminists after she 
organized a conference devoted to examining the intersection between sexual pleasure and 
danger on women's lives and within feminist understanding of female sexual agency. 
14. See Hartley, supra note 5, at 142 (arguing against defining a feminist porn star as 
oxymoronic within the current feminist climate). 
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and others who reject or are rejected by the feminist label. Within the 
debate, those focusing primarily on woman's liberty or choices argue that 
the goal of feminism should be to increase women's sexual choices, liberty 
and pleasure to the level that men enjoy. 15 They argue that women have 
sexual desires which, although not necessarily identical to those of men, 
can equal men's in intensity. Therefore feminists should fight for women 
to have the same level of sexual freedom as men. 16 However, this model of 
feminism ignores the constraints sexual violence and sex -based power 
inequalities place on women's sexual liberty. Unfortunately, in our society 
sexual, or "bad" women, are often considered easy targets of sexual abuse 
because many people believe their abuse in not as deserving of criminal 
sanction as the abuse of "good" women.17 Such a choice feminism 
irresponsibly ignores the potentially abusive result of women exercising 
sexual freedom in a society which constrains such activity through sexual 
violence. 
The other extreme model, exemplified by radical anti-pornography 
feminists, focuses solely on the constraints on women's sexuality. This 
position has come to be commonly associated with the arguments of 
Catharine MacKinnon. I8 She argues male hierarchy is so pervasive that 
there is no female sexuality separate from that created by "the hierarchical 
relations ... [and t]his process creates the social beings we know as women 
and men .... ,,19 Pornography holds a central position in her theory as the 
tool through which the male dominated hierarchy constructs sexuality, 
making sexism or gender inequality the sexual norm and therefore 
invisible.2o Moreover, because this process creates gender categories, the 
sexualization of the dominance of women, or pornography, defines 
15. See generally supra note 12, at xvii (outlining second-wave feminists' commitment to 
increasing women's sexual freedom). 
16. For examples of arguments grounded on such feminism, see Katie Roiphe, Date 
Rape's Other Victim: In Their Claims of a Date-Rape Epidemic on Campus, Feminists 
Subvert Their Own Cause, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, Section 6, at 26; NADINE STROSSEN, 
DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT OVER WOMEN'S RIGHTS 14 
(1995) (defending pornography against censorship in order to protect women's freedom, 
status, dignity and autonomy). 
17. See Jan Jordan, Feminism and Sex Work: Connections and Contradictions, in 
FEMINIST VOICES: WOMEN'S STUDIES TEXTS FOR AOTEAROAINEW ZEALAND 180 (Rosemary 
D. Plessis et al. eds., 1992); Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the 
Eroticization of Domination, in SEXY DRESSING ETC. : ESSAYS ON THE POWER AND POLITICS 
OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 126 (1993). 
18. Some of the other most influential anti-pornography feminists, and their texts, 
include: Lara Lederer, TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY (Lara Lederer 
ed., 1980); SUSAN GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCE: CULTURE'S REVENGE AGAINST 
NATURE (1981); and ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1979). 
19. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 46,49 (1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]. 
20. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, 
and Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 19, at 166, 172. 
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"woman" as the dominated. To be male is to be dominant. 21 Thus, 
pornography is and perpetuates sex discrimination, leaving no room for the 
construction of female sexual agency free of male hierarchy's influence. 
According to MacKinnon, sexuality is the eroticization of the 
dominance and subordination of women. 22 Moreover, MacKinnon treats 
pornography and rape law as texts capable of normatively policing and 
constructing female sexual agency into an image in accordance with 
heterosexual male desire, as is illustrated in the following quote. 
The law of rape divides women into spheres of consent according 
to indices of relationship to men. Which category of presumed 
consent a woman is in depends upon who she is relative to a man 
who wants her, not on what she says or does. These categories tell 
men whom they can legally fuck, who is open season and who is 
off limits . . .. The paradigm categories are the virginal daughter 
and other young girls, with whom all sex is proscribed, and the 
whorelike wives and prostitutes, with whom no sex is proscribed.23 
In juxtaposition to her description of the constructed female sexuality, 
MacKinnon argues that the "truth" behind pornography, and therefore 
sexuality, is the abuse of women-in making pornography, and their future 
abuse by men socialized or constructed through pornography to think that 
they enjoy being abused or subordinated. 24 Moreover, because 
MacKinnon's theory is purported to be a mere objective description of the 
construction process of sexuality in contemporary society, she defines 
criticism of her views as a disbelief in the reality of this description, or in 
the reality of the abuse of women in society. 25 
The claim of "merely describing facts" or stating the truth serves as a 
powerful rhetorical device. It denies the possibility for valid objection 
except for the occasional narrative contradicting the description. Such 
narratives are therefore granted only limited persuasive value; they can 
either be reinterpreted as to be incorporated into the dominant theory of 
21. See id. 
22. See id. at 172 (pornography "institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, fusing 
the erotization of dominance and submission with the social construction of male and 
female"). 
23. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 175 (1989). 
24. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra 
note 19, at 198-99. See also MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 179-90 (describing abuses of 
women which justify her and Andrea Dworkin's anti pornography statute); ANDREA 
DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY 
FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 41-51 (1988) (describing provisions of the anti-pornography 
ordinance and the descriptions of harms of women that led to their drafting the statute). 
25. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra 
note 19, at 198-200 (creating a dichotomy between her "truthful" description of the harms 
and abuses of pornography, and the false and collaborative intentions of her feminist critics, 
in her essay). 
Wi' 
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truth, or be dismissed as an aberration. Any other attempts at criticizing the 
"truth" are easily labeled as the result of ignorance, false consciousness26 or 
the result of a deviant (anti) feminist who collaborates with the male 
structure to keep other women down in society and refuses to acknowledge 
the voices of abused women. 27 
Many feminists have attempted to critique MacKinnon's theory and 
methodology as illustrated above by: 1) using examples or selective voices 
of women experiencing danger and abuse to represent all of women's 
concerns and experiences-or conflating examples with all of reality;28 2) 
treating written and film texts as capable of constructing sexual 
socialization or society; 29 and 3) claiming to describe and vocalize the 
truth-a process which consigns critiques to the status of apostates. 30 
However, powerful criticism of this model, which I believe is necessary, is 
more difficult than that of choice feminism. 
Choice feminism can be criticized successfully through reference to, 
and authentication of, data concerning the enormity of sexual assault 
against women and the disproportionate abuse of "bad" women, such as 
prostitutes deemed overly sexual in our society,31 and through reference to 
court cases granting less protection in rapes of sexual women. 32 Yet such 
criticism of constraint feminists is made virtually impossible by its dual 
device of maintaining a "rhetoric of truth,,,33 and of defining opposition, no 
matter how mild, as collaboration, as ignoring or being ignorant of the 
subordination and abuses of women, or as being selfishly interested in the 
liberty of privileged women. This labels feminist critique as representative 
of "choice" feminism, and simultaneously critiques choice feminism as 
collaborative or anti-feminist. 
This rhetoric of "truth," and the defining of opposition as antithetical or 
false, works to negate the possibility of devising a united rhetoric of choice 
26. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED, supra note 19, at 258 n.1 (arguing women falsely and unknowingly accept and 
accommodate male defined female sexuality). 
27. See MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 198, 202. 
28. See, e.g., Carole S. Vance, More Danger, More Pleasure: A Decade after the 
Barnard Sexuality Conference, in PLEASURE AND DANGER, supra note 12, at xvii. 
29. See, e.g., MARCIA PALLY, SENSE & CENSORSHIP: THE VANITY OF BONFIRES 59-61 
(1991); Lynne Segal, Does Pornography Cause Violence: The Search For Evidence, in 
DIRTY LOOKS: WOMEN, PORNOGRAPHY, POWER 5, 17-18 (Pamela Church Gibson & Roma 
Gibson eds., 1993). 
30. See, e.g., Jane Flax, The End of Innocence, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 
458 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992). 
31. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 17, at 180. 
32. See Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1981) (allowing evidence of a 
rape victim's previous arrests for prostitution toward motive to falsely accuse defendant of 
rape); Rusk v. State of Maryland, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (victim who 
went into a man's apartment determined to have insufficiently resisted to the degree 
necessary for a married woman to up hold a conviction of rape). 
33. See supra note 8. 
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and constraint. By claiming to be speaking and defining the "truth," radical 
anti-pornography constraint feminism works to define any criticism as 
false. Because its claims are the "truth," it does so innocently. It does not 
have to internalize a consciousness of acting out of exclusionary power in 
order to compel others to follow its normative beliefs. 34 
Pure "choice" rhetoric does not carry with it this rhetoric of truth. 
Rather, it emphasizes women's ability to choose different directions. 
Likewise it does not inherently define its opposition as the "untrue," but as 
an alternate choice. 35 It is therefore open to criticism; it is susceptible to 
better arguments. In fact, it is highly susceptible to opponents who offer 
claims of a countering "truth." As demonstrated earlier, choice feminists 
are in fact susceptible to critique in that they ignore the reality, or "truth," 
of the constraints of violence imposed upon women's ability to make 
choices. 
The constraint rhetoric of radical anti-pornography feminism, by 
contrast, defines all criticism as "untrue," as apostate, or as "choice." 
There is no room for both truth and falsity. A description of women's lives 
and challenges is either true or false. Therefore, even if one were to try to 
create a feminism of both choice and constraint, this description could not 
be understood within the feminist discourse informed by the rhetoric of 
radical feminism. Such attempts will be, and are, redefined within the 
discourse of contemporary feminism to be "false," or concerned solely with 
choice rather than the domination of women. 36 
Thus radical feminism works to construct the dichotomy between 
choice and constraint which contemporary feminism seems unable or 
unwilling to abandon.37 Only by first demonstrating the normative power-
driven, non-innocent nature of the radical feminist description (or 
evaluation) of female nature and its divisive methodology, can feminism 
34. See Flax, supra note 30, at 458 (arguing feminist claims of describing "truth" are in 
fact not free of complicity in the domination of others because feminists work to compel 
agreement with their claims that are in fact not natural truths). 
35. I do not claim that no "choice" feminists claim to describe the "truth," and in tum, 
define their critics as arguing the "untrue" or as anti-feminists. Such arguments have been 
made, particularly within the context of the pornography debate, in reaction to radical 
feminists' rhetoric of truth. I discuss these "truth" choice arguments in section I(D), 
demonstrating that they suffer from the same political disadvantages as do constraint "truth" 
arguments. 
36. See, e.g., Vance, supra note 28, at xxi (recounting how her attempts to organize a 
conference concerned with both choice and constraint, or pleasure and danger, were 
redefined by choice anti-pornography feminists as "anti-feminist"). 
37. I do not claim radical feminism's rhetoric and its influence on the contemporary 
feminist discourse is the only reason a rhetoric of choice within constraints is rejected. 
There are, of course, other philosophical and political reasons for objecting to such an 
inclusive rhetoric for feminist jurisprudence, and I address in detail some of these objections 
in Sections IT and in the conclusion of this Article. However, I do want to emphasize that 
the rhetoric of truth of radical feminism does assist in at least maintaining the dichotomy 
between choice and constraint ever-present within contemporary feminist jurisprudence. 
z 
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emerge to address the possibility of female agency while also recognizing 
the historic abuse of women at the hands of men. Once the radical 
feminism rhetoric of truth is recognized to be normative, feminist discourse 
generally can expand to allow the possibility of a debate over the benefits 
and disadvantages of a rhetoric of choice within constraint, and a 
discussion as to whether opening up such a discourse may lead to a more 
inclusive political feminism. 
Methodology 
The remainder of this section develops a deconstructionalist analysis of 
radical feminist methodology in order to destabilize this school's truth 
rhetoric and expose the exclusionary and evaluative judgments made by 
many contemporary feminists. It is important to understand that the goal of 
this analysis is to create room for a more inclusive feminism, not through 
rejecting constraint feminism, but by embracing it alongside choice 
feminism. By employing deconstructionist techniques, one can read and 
critique radical feminism from within radical feminism, retaining the 
benefits of its analysis while critiquing and modifying its weaknesses. 
Thus, by "deconstructing" radical feminism's rhetoric of truth, the 
objective is not to reject radical feminist methodology and ideology but to 
use it to open it up to uncover within it surprises or unexpected subtexts.38 
The text of radical feminism is approached with the assumption that there 
is no one correct reading of this or any text, but that many contradictory 
readings may coexist. 39 I use radical feminism's own methodology to 
"open up spaces in or from which different and more varied ideas and 
practices may begin to emerge.,,40 The process of systematically 
employing the methodology and ideology I am critiquing places me within 
the discourse of radical feminism. I am not a detached reader but am 
completely involved in the discourse.41 
More importantly, while part of this deconstructionist enterprise is 
concerned with a traditional Derridarian process of identifying concepts 
labeled as apostates within a text and disrupting their binary opposition by 
demonstrating how the text creates these binary oppositions.42 This 
formulation is not my primary use of "deconstruction" in this Article. 
While it is interesting how radical feminism assists in constructing or 
maintaining an unnecessary dichotomy between choice and constraint 
feminism, it is not the primary objective of this piece. 
Rather, by deconstructing radical feminism, I endeavor to reveal the 
38. See BARBARA JOHNSON, A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE 15-16 (1987). 
39. See id. at 15. See also JANE FLAX, THINKING FRAGMENTS: PSYCHOANALYSIS, 
FEMINISM, & POSTMODERNISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WEST 39 (1990). 
40. FLAX, supra note 39, at 31. 
41. See JONATHON CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER 
STRUCTURALISM 87-88 (1982). 
42. See id. at 86. See also FLAX, supra note 39, at 36-37. 
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internally contradictory nature of its principle of "truth" and its apparent 
unity. Such a method assumes that reality is always heterogeneous and 
differentiated, and therefore any appearance of unity signifies a suppression 
of someone or something left out of the description of what is real. Unity 
signifies an exercise of power or suppression. Therefore, what is truly 
interesting is what has been suppressed by the text, what is left out, and 
what techniques or strategies are used in order to claim its representational 
authority. 43 As the rhetoric of truth operates within radical feminism to 
suppress opposition, this truth needs to be tested. This section serves as a 
test of such feminism from within its own theory, and by using its own 
tools. 
More importantly, in examining radical feminism from within its own 
text, this analysis utilizes subjects through which to examine radical 
feminism precisely because they are subjects of special interest to the 
radical feminist. They most obviously involve situations of dominance 
through sexuality: pornography and prostitution. Furthermore, Catharine 
MacKinnon's work is examined repeatedly throughout this Article as 
representing radical feminism because MacKinnon is perhaps the most 
widely recognized radical feminist in the United States and holds an elite 
position of power within feminism to define the movement. These subjects 
and MacKinnon's work will serve as useful texts through which to analyze 
the radical feminist analysis of domination and power, while 
simultaneously examining the possibility of radical feminism's exercise of 
the power of normative exclusion. 
However, I have twisted the discussions of pornography and 
prostitution within this Article in ways which directly contradict traditional 
radical feminist description. Ideas to be discussed include the idea that 
feminists such as MacKinnon can be collaborators in the oppression of 
women and the idea that prostitutes, often portrayed within radical feminist 
texts as silenced abused prostituted women unable to speak for 
themselves,44 are writing their own autobiographies and organizing their 
own presses to publish them. These ideas involve traditional radical 
feminist concepts of power and domination, but not in the way feminists 
usually formulate them. These are subjects which are generally embraced 
by radical feminism, but the particular slants presented in this article are 
rejected for study or acknowledgment by such feminists. I have chosen 
these subjects to reflect my desire to embrace, yet look for contradictions 
and surprise within the text of radical feminism. 
43. See FLAX, supra note 39, at 36-38. 
44. See, e.g., DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 24, at 24-25; Evelina Giobbe, 
Confronting the liberal lies About Prostitution, in THE SEXUAL LIBERALS AND THE ATTACK 
ON FEMINISM 67 (Dorchen Leidhodlt & Janice G. Raymond eds., 1990). 
t 
146 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10: 1 
B. HOW RAPE CONSTRUCTS SEXUALITY: OUTLINING RADICAL 
FEMINIST METHODOLOGY 
One goal of this Article's deconstructionalist analysis of radical 
feminism is to use such feminism's methodology to demonstrate its 
benefits and deficiencies in constructing a single unifying image of female 
sexuality. A deconstructionalist critique illustrates the invaluable 
perspective gained through application of radical feminism's methods in 
highlighting the significance of dominance to society's treatment of sex 
differences. However, a deconstructionalist critique also explains why 
such methodology and its resulting ideology cannot be tested for producing 
universally truthful results and theory. Its methodology defies testing and 
can even work against itself to prove the normative nature of its own 
theory. Its methodology serves to prove it conflates description with 
evaluation. Thus, a deconstructionalist analysis allows for a critique of 
radical feminism's claims of representing truth while maintaining and 
incorporating the benefits of a rhetoric concerned with power inequality. 
I begin this deconstructionalist critique by developing a MacKinnon-
like reading of three sexual assault cases to illustrate radical feminism's 
"description" of the normative and constructive function of rape law within 
male hierarchy. As illustrated in the introduction of this Section, such a 
MacKinnon-like reading may employ the following methodological devises 
common to MacKinnon's writings: conflating examples with a generalized 
reality; treating individual written or film texts as capable of singularly 
constructing societal norms; and employing a rhetoric of truth that consigns 
one's critics to the status of apostates.45 The point of this initial reading is 
to highlight and illustrate the strengths of radical feminism's critique of 
sex-based power inequities and societal norms which function to reinforce 
sexist violence. After describing these strengths, the reading moves on to 
destabilize radical feminism's rhetoric by performing a similar radical-style 
examination focusing on the power inequities of this type of feminism 
itself. 
From the earlier summary of Catharine MacKinnon's radical anti-
pornography theory, one can see that MacKinnon analyzes society 
(including law) for its subtexts of power.46 She is concerned with who is 
dominant and how dominance is perpetuated. MacKinnon's reading of law 
and cases for their subtexts of power serves as a useful analytical tool for 
demonstrating how the treatment of consent in cases concerning sexual 
violence reflects and reinforces gender stereotypes of women as sexual 
willing victims and of men as masculine aggressors. By using as a 
45. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
46. Like other radical feminists, MacKinnon focuses her social feminist analysis on 
identifying power inequities which serve to dominate women. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED, supra note 19, at 40. 
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methodological base MacKinnon's presumption that individual cases are 
capable of constructing society and therefore the law,47 this section argues 
that the stereotypical portrayal of alleged victims in legal materials 
constructs and polices sexual behavior of individuals to conform to norms 
held by society and the courts-a reflection of heterosexual male desire. 
Moreover, it is demonstrated that through the law women's domination is 
sexualized and their consent is ignored (or made a non-issue). Women are 
policed to be either "good" or to accept their role as perpetual eager 
purveyors of sex to men. Moreover, through this construction of male and 
female sexual roles, homosexuality is made invisible as a valid form of 
sexuality. Through the use of MacKinnon's methodology, it becomes 
apparent that the courts' rulings in these cases develop such themes while 
attempting to resolve real conflicts in society, but they do not describe the 
truth of human sexuality. They construct and police individuals into 
conformance with a normative vision of sexuality. 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts relied upon a reasonableness 
standard in ruling that evidence of a rape victim's previous arrests for 
prostitution are relevant to her possible motivation to falsely accuse the 
defendant of rape-further arguing that it is reasonable for a woman having 
been arrested for prostitution twice in similar situations (after being found 
naked in a car parked in a parking lot) to cry rape in order to avoid 
potential arrest and further prosecution.48 However, essential to the court's 
determination of reasonableness, was a reliance upon the facts of the case 
as presented by the defendant. 
The prosecution claims that after picking up the victim hitchhiking, the 
defendant drove her to a parking lot and forced her to perform oral sex and 
have intercourse.49 In the course of her attempts to escape twice, the 
defendant punched the victim multiple times. 50 Eventually, 
[s]eeing the headlights of an approaching car, the complainant ... 
naked and bleeding around the mouth, jumped from the 
defendant's car and ran toward the other car screaming and waving 
her arms. The other car was a police cruiser. The police officers 
testified that they had entered the lot to investigate screams.51 
The defendant concedes that he picked the woman up hitchhiking, but 
he claimed that she had been beaten by her boyfriend before he picked her 
up, and therefore had already been bleeding.52 He further claimed they 
entered the parking lot at her request so she could smoke some "angel 
47. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
48. Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181,187 (Mass. 1981). 
49. See id. at 183. 
50. See id. 
51. Id. 
52. See id. 
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dust"and it was then she suggested they have sex.53 He alleged that upon 
seeing the police car approach, he warned the complainant to get dressed as 
they were both naked. She "jumped out, ran to the cruiser, and accused 
him of raping her," screaming for the first time as she approached the 
police. 54 
What makes the possibility of the woman's lying reasonable to the 
court is the assumption that the facts as presented by the defendant are 
reasonable-that it is reasonable for a man to want to have sex with a 
beaten woman; that a woman would choose to remain the girlfriend of a 
man who beats her; and that such a woman is reasonably capable of 
consenting to sex. The court found: 
The bias theory is not inconsistent with the defendant's version of 
the facts. The relevancy of testimony depends on whether it has a 
'rational tendency to prove an issue in the case.' We cannot say 
that this evidence has no rational tendency to prove that the 
complainant was falsely motivated to accuse the defendant of rape 
by a desire to avoid further prosecution. 55 
By the logic of the court, it appears "normal" or "reasonable" for 
women to consent to violent relationships, as well as normal for men to 
want to have sex with bloody beaten women. The woman's bloody mouth 
becomes irrelevant as to the issue of non-consent; it is in fact reconstructed 
through the "reasonableness" of the defendant's narrative to imply that 
there had been consent. 
The fact that the complainant is a prostitute also plays an interesting 
role in the law's construction of female consent. The court claims that 
under the law, whether a woman engages in sex for hire is irrelevant as to 
her credibility as a witness.56 However, this appeal would not exist as 
formulated (i.e., around the question of whether evidence of a rape victim's 
previous arrests for prostitution are relevant to motivation to falsely accuse 
a defendant and can be admitted into evidence as an exception to rape 
shield laws) but for the fact that this victim is a prostitute. Furthermore, the 
conviction would not have been reversed and remanded for retrial if she 
had not been known and labeled as a prostitute by the police. According to 
the defendant, it is because of such labeling that she allegedly feared 
prosecution and therefore allegedly falsely accused the defendant. Finally, 
her future vulnerability to rape is increased by this legal decision because 
of her occupation as a prostitute. Any man might now be capable of 
forcing her to have sex in a parking lot without any legal ramifications. 
The law, via the court's creation of an exception to rape-shield law based 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 187. 
56. See id. at 185, 187. 
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on bias, has defined her as rapable, or rather as non-rapable. Her status as a 
prostitute defines her consent. The law "tell[s] men whom they can legally 
fuck.,,57 And just as the law tells men who they can legally fuck, the law 
also conveys the same message to women. 58 Logic tells us that men and 
women alike, as members of the same society, would be constructed 
sexually by the law. Yet the law appears to serve the male interest while 
constructing gender. MacKinnon summarizes this phenomenon by arguing 
that the law constructs female sexuality in view of what men desire. 59 
As is seen through the above analysis of Joyce, part of the work of 
enforcing the male-desired norm upon women is the necessity to police 
women's behavior so it conforms to this desire. Women are not only 
constructed by the male law, their roles are created, or policed by it. Joyce 
teaches women that if they are "bad" women, or whores, they can be 
fucked. Women learn to either be good or expect to be fucked as part of 
the norm in our society. Thus rape law polices women to fit into the norm 
of rape culture-to accept the idea that women like to be fucked, that 
whores always like to fuck, that once a woman fucks she cannot stop 
fucking. There is no rape of "bad" women. Radical feminists would argue 
that this is not the truth of female sexuality: 
[I]t is questionable that this sexuality is 'women's' in the sense that 
we own or possess it, or even that it accurately characterizes us. It 
is, however, the sexuality that is attributed to women by [men] ... 
. Women, under conditions of sex-inequality, then may come to 
exhibit it or even claim and embrace it as their own.60 
In summary, it is true that women can want to say "no" after once 
saying "yes," but women who do are taught and internalize the norm that 
they will not be listened to. And for certain, the prostitute who stood up 
against this norm in Joyce was not listened to by the court. 
In contrast to Joyce are cases involving male victimization. As 
discussed above, the Joyce court found reasonable both the idea of a 
woman consenting to sex after being beaten, and the idea that a woman 
may be party to an abusive relationship. In contrast, in 196761 a California 
appellate court ruled "[i]t is ... of common knowledge that a normal 
person in full possession of his mental faculties does not freely consent to 
57. See MacKinnon, supra note 23, at 175. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, More Than Simply a Magazine: Playboy's Money, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 19, at 258 n.l (emphasis in original). 
61. I have chosen to analyze this case despite the fact that it is thirty years old because it 
remains good law in California and has been followed in at least three other states. See, e.g., 
State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303,306 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); State v. Hatfield, 356 N.W.2d 
872,876 (Neb. 1984); State v. Brown, 364 A.2d 27,30 (N.J. Ct. App. 1976). 
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the use, upon himself, of force likely to produce great bodily injury.,,62 
Despite the fact that the alleged male victims of the defendant voluntarily 
participated and consented to the filming of sadomasochistic activities with 
the defendant, and despite the fact none of the victims were even contacted 
by the prosecution or portrayed as having any complaints against the 
defendant, the Samuels court rejects their ability to consent. Why is a man 
who has no complaints of his treatment deemed unable to consent to abuse, 
while evidence of the bloody, beaten mouth of a woman who charges rape, 
who claims to have been abused, is deemed irrelevant? 
Radical feminists such as MacKinnon who read texts for sex-based 
power differentials63 would likely argue the difference between the two 
cases lies in the gender construction of men and women. The court in 
Joyce presumes it is reasonable for a man to have sex with a bloody 
woman, and reasonable for a known prostitute to want sex after being 
beaten. 64 In Samuels, the court rejects the reasonableness of any man 
placed in a victim-like position by denying the possibility of consent in 
such situations.65 As radical feminists such as MacKinnon would predict, 
courts' legal standard of reasonableness appear to reinforce and reflect 
society's gender role stereotypes of women as victims and men as 
aggressors. 
Yet just as Joyce was shown to construct and police female sexuality, 66 
Samuels also serves a policing function on sexual desire. The active 
policing and constructing role of both these cases is perhaps best illustrated 
through a discussion of consent. Both cases reject the complainant's own 
protests of consent, whether in the affirmative as in Samuels or in the 
negative as in Joyce. Thus the courts actively dismiss the "realities" of the 
complainants' lives or wills and replace instead their own interpretations of 
what constitutes true consent. The courts' truths are not objective but 
normative. 
Samuels also serves to police images of acceptable or recognized 
sexuality by making invisible the homosexual experience as a valid 
lifestyle. This function of Samuels can be viewed through examining why 
the sadomasochistic videotapes did not serve as evidence that the gay 
"bottoms," or masochists, consent to sadomasochistic homosexual sex. 
As a conclusion to its methodological presumption that individual 
written or film texts are as capable of singularly societal norms, radical 
feminists such as MacKinnon have argued that pornographic imagery 
62. People v. Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d 501, 513-14 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 
1024 (1968) (upholding conviction of a self-proclaimed sadist for aggravated assault of his 
consensual masochistic partners). 
63. See supra note 46. 
64. See Joyce, 415 NE.2d 183-87. See also supra text accompanying notes 52-55. 
65. See Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d at 513-14. 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60. 
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serves to create and inform gender roles and expectations-that the 
pornographic defines what "normal" sex is. 67 Following this logic, one 
might conclude that films of explicit sexual conduct such as those at issue 
in Samuels should be evidence that such acts are "normal" or consented to. 
Such a similar conclusion forms the basis of MacKinnon's explanation of 
the social acceptance of the "lies" or presumptions of consent behind Linda 
(Lovelace) Marchiano's performance in 1970's pornography classic, Deep 
Throat. 68 
MacKinnon argues that Marchiano's performance in the film is 
perceived and defined as consensual, despite Marchiano's claims that she 
was forced at gun point to perform in pornography, because Marchiano's 
normal consenting sexuality as a woman is defined by the pornographic 
film. 69 "The superficial lie, that we [women] get pleasure in ways we do 
not, is the central conceit. The deeper lie is that Linda enjoyed it.,,70 
Moreover, MacKinnon argues that the pornographic construction of 
female sexuality as synonymous with abuse can apply to any man placed in 
a subordinate gendered position in pornography-or for any biological man 
who is defined by being subordinated as a gendered woman. For this 
reason, she and Andrea Dworkin constructed an anti-pornography statute 
that allows women-identified individuals hurt through pornography civil 
remedies so that "[m]en, children, and transsexuals, all of whom are 
sometimes violated like women through and in pornography can sue for 
similar treatment.',n 
However, in Samuels, the court uses the film as evidence of non-
consent despite the fact that the victims are men placed in subordinate 
passive positions, and thus defined female. Yet, Samuels is distinguishable 
from Linda Marchiano's case. In Samuels, the court notes that there is no 
penile penetration of the alleged victims-Samuels was acquitted on the 
count of sodomy.72 The court also never refers to the movies as "sexual," 
or even affirmatively acknowledges the prurient quality73 of the films, 
saying only that the films "allegedly" possess prurient appea1.74 
Furthermore, when discussing the fact that the Kinsey Institute had a 
scientific interest in these films, that interest is explained to be in the 
67. See MACKJNNON, supra note 20, at 171. 
68. See MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 128-29. 
69. See id. 
70. Id. 
71. MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 201. 
72. See Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d at 510. 
73. That some material appeals to the prurient interest is required to find such material 
obscene under the Miller test for obscenity. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 
(1973). The definition of "prurient interests" was further refined by the Supreme Court in 
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985). Only appeals to a shameful or 
morbid interest in sex are prurient. The Court did not further specify how "normal" sex was 
to be distinguished from the "shameful" or "morbid." Id. 
74. See Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d at 510. 
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subject of sadomasochism generally.75 The sexual nature of these films is 
dismissed, ignored and rendered invisible. Additionally, the court's 
passive emphasis of the films asexual nature implies that the apparent 
asexual appearance of these films influenced the court's decision. 
I ask what would have happened if sexual conduct, defined as penile 
penetration, were present? Perhaps the victims would have been judged or 
treated as gendered female and the case would have come out the other 
way-respecting the victim's right to consent to abuse. Perhaps the 
victims would not have been termed victims at all, but participants, and the 
abuse would have been found to be reasonably sexual (or more precisely, 
as heterosexual, since the victim is woman-like and the sexual conduct 
would have involved penile penetration), not abuse. 
This theory gains support when juxtaposing Samuels with People v. 
Alfaro where a California court distinguished cases involving both rape and 
assault from sadomasochistic cases impacted by the Samuels law, 
reasoning that rape charges inherently allow for a consent defense 
regardless of the violence involved. 76 In the context of this case, the court 
stresses, citing Samuels, that "consent is never a defense to an assault 
which results in great bodily injury," but that a rape such as this one, which 
involves an assault, is defensible through evidence of consent.77 This 
distinction is not based on whether violent abuse occurs, but rather whether 
penile-vaginal penetration is present in addition to a violent assault. Once 
penetration occurs, women are deemed capable of consenting; men are 
given an opportunity to justify their assaultive behavior as reasonable 
sexual conduct. 
Thus, developing a MacKinnon-like radical reading of these three cases 
illuminates their normative visions and awards us valuable insight into the 
significance of sexual dominance within the law. As illustrated earlier, 
such a MacKinnon-like reading may employ the following methodological 
tools common to MacKinnon's writings: conflating examples with a 
generalized reality; treating individual written or film texts as capable of 
singularly constructing societal norms; and employing a rhetoric of truth 
that consigns one's critics to the status of apostates.78 The goal of this 
initial reading was to highlight and illustrate the strengths of radical 
feminism's critique of sex-based power inequities and societal norms 
which function to reinforce sexist violence. This reading demonstrates that 
in addition to policing female sexuality and constructing consent, the only 
sexuality acknowledged as such by the courts is heterosexuality; courts 
normatively limit the representation of sexuality to mirror the desires of 
75. See id. at 504. 
76. See People v. Alfaro, 61 Cal. App. 3d 414,418-19 (1976) (victim was sixteen year-
old girl who was severely beaten and raped by two men). 
77. Id. at 429. 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
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heterosexual men. 
Now that the strengths of a radical feminist "description" of the 
normative and constructive function of rape law within male hierarchy 
have been highlighted, the next section moves to destabilize radical 
feminism's rhetoric by performing on radical feminism itself a similar 
radical style examination focusing on power inequities. 
C. HOW RADICAL FEMINISM REINFORCES RAPE: OUTLINING 
THE NORMATIVE NATURE OF UNIVERSAL THEORIES OF 
AGENCY 
This section now applies the same radical analytic framework as used 
in the previous section to analyze rape law and to examine as an 
independent text radical feminism's own methodology and ideology. 
Ironically, applying such an analysis to radical feminism results in the 
finding that radical feminism reinforces and perpetuates the same male-
hierarchy it purports to critique. This finding destabalizes the radical 
feminist portrayal of women's "reality," and shows it to be false in that it is 
not testable. Once radical feminism's truth is destabilized, room can be 
made to critique the political feasibility of its normative description of 
women's agency and its reliance on a rhetoric of truth. 
The deconstructionist analysis in this section focuses on the norms 
replicated by rape law identified in the previous section as being derived 
from gender inequality and thus resulting in a rape-facilitating/encouraging 
culture. Because of the gender imbalance inherent in these norms, 
examining texts and social arrangements for them serves as a tool for 
locating power inequalities. By looking for, and finding within radical 
feminisms' own texts these identified hierarchy-based norms, this section 
will demonstrate that radical feminism's rhetorical claim to be "describing 
the truth" is as normative as the construction of sexuality underlying rape 
law. Likewise, radical feminism is shown to exercise exclusionary power 
to construct a uniform notion and perception of female nature, excluding all 
opposition to the detriment of women who do not fit this vision. 
Once again, within its deconstructionalist analysis of radical feminism, 
this section uses the writings of Catharine MacKinnon to exemplify radical 
feminism. In examining radical feminism for its own exercise of power, it 
is useful to focus on a feminist who has reached a position of dominance 
within this field. Examing the powerful in order to understand the power 
dynamics of a setting or culture is crucial. Therefore, this section will 
analyze MacKinnon's ideology through her own methodology. Through 
this examination, MacKinnon's exclusion of any and all opposition from 
the "true" feminist rank is shown not to be the result of innocent desire to 
adhere to the "truth" of sexual subordination and domination of women, 
but an exercise of power on her part to construct a uniform notion and 
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perception of female nature, much like that of the rape culture she 
cntIcIzes. Additionally, by demonstrating how MacKinnon erroneously 
conflates the descriptive with the evaluative, one can see how her definition 
of opposition as apostates works to feed her normative vision of the lack of 
female sexual agency. MacKinnon's radical feminism normatively closes 
the door to a feminist theory that incorporates both notions of choice and 
cons traint. 
This argument is not meant to imply that MacKinnon actually 
perpetuates rape. However, one of my methods for deconstructing her 
claims of adhering to a methodology and ideology, which innocently 
describes the "truth" of female domination, is to examine how her rhetoric 
itself gives away the falsity of these claims. This deconstruction 
demonstrates how her methodology is not "testable" for creating and 
describing a true reality, but rather, ironically, such methodology can be 
turned on itself to find similar results regardless of the subject matter which 
it is applied to. Her methodology and her "rhetoric of truth," which uses 
examples to represent all of experience and treats all text as capable of 
creating reality, can be seen as causing MacKinnon to conflate description 
with evaluation. This conflation, combined with her systematic exclusion 
of all criticism from her ranks, leads to a method of argument which defies 
testing or refutation. Applying her theory when analyzing her own writings 
as an independent text leads to an awareness that this conflation of 
description and evaluation allows even the bizarre conclusion that 
MacKinnon promotes rape to be made without refutation. Therefore, 
development of the illogical and bizarre argument, which follows from her 
own methodology, of MacKinnon as collaborating in the oppression of 
women and reinforcing rape culture, highlights the falsity and normative 
nature of her own rhetoric. 
For purposes of this argument I will focus on one piece by 
Mac Kinnon, 79 "On Collaboration, ,,80 as it concisely summarizes her 
arguments regarding gender inequality and pornography and because much 
of her article is devoted to interchangeably asserting her position as "truth" 
or "reality,,,81 and defining feminist opposition to her arguments as 
ignoring this truth and collaborating in the oppression of women. 82 
79. While reliance on only one piece by MacKinnon may open this argument to criticism 
for not being representative, it is done out of my desire to rigorously rely on MacKinnon's 
own methodology in analyzing her ideology. As described in the text accompanying supra 
notes 28-30, MacKinnon's methodology includes conflating examples with a generalized 
reality and treating individual texts as capable of singularly constructing societal norms. 
Therefore, my reliance on only one of her texts as representative of her work is done in 
adherence to MacKinnon's own methodology out of a desire to rigorously rely on 
MacKinnon's own methodology in analyzing her ideology. 
80. MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 198. 
81. [d. 
82. For one example of this argument within the text, see id. at 205. 
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Examination of her own theory points to the same type of policing 
practices highlighted in the above description of rape-culture. 
The first norm policed by rape law described in the section above is the 
"reality" of women as divided into two groups-those who always fuck 
(and who like to fuck) and those who are not to be fucked (who are not 
attributed any sexual desire or are not desired by men). Once a woman 
becomes a "bad" sexual woman, she cannot become a "good" woman-she 
is not believed to be a "good" woman ever again. Her example teaches 
other women either to avoid sexuality or to accept their non-rapable status. 
Rather than merely describing this normative process of gender 
construction, I argue MacKinnon also helps to construct this norm of 
female sexuality through her own writings. First, MacKinnon clearly sets 
up an antithesis between herself and her opponents to define "good" and 
"bad" woman, or "good" and "bad" feminist. Within the pornography 
debate, she aligns herself with the "truth" of female sexual abuse, claiming 
to respect women's real experience. 83 Yet, she does not respect women 
who criticize her position. She describes women who oppose her as 
denying the abuse of women and acting as collaborators in women's 
domination-they are the "bad" or the anti feminists. 
Why, when women's agony and pain becomes what pornographers 
want to say, when our bodies are their media of expression, are 
women lawyers, feminists, among those who tell us it is only an 
idea, information, symbolic, a fantasy, just representation? Aren't 
these women real to them either?84 
Women who defend the pornographers are defending a source of 
their relatively high position among women under male supremacy, 
keeping all women, including them, an inferior class on the basis of 
sex, enforced by sexual force. 85 
She further establishes the dichotomy between herself and her 
opposition in the following confrontation with her feminist opposition. 
I really want you to stop your lies and misrepresentations of our 
position. I want you to do something about your thundering 
ignorance about the way women are treated. I want you to 
remember your own lives. I also really want you on our side. But, 
failing that, I want you to stop claiming that your liberalism, with 
its elitism, and your Freudianism, with its sexualized misogyny, 
83. See id. at 199 (claiming to speak the truth of women's experience of abuse). 
84. [d. at 201. 
85. [d. at 205. 
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has anything in common with feminism. 86 
Interestingly, according to MacKinnon, these 'bad' or anti-feminists 
are also the sexual feminists, the feminists with desire, who are willing to 
sell out other women for their own sexual gratification and power. 
It's ... frustrating to have women lawyers, feminists, say or act as 
though [the sexual abuse of women through pornography] doesn't 
happen-or, if it does, that it is not as important as the pleasure to 
be gotten from it. 87 
Why are women lawyers, feminists, siding with the 
pornographers? To be a lawyer orients you to power, probably 
sexually as well as in every other way. 88 
Thus, the "bad" women to MacKinnon are the "sexual" women. 
Ironically, MacKinnon's "bad" women are the "bad" sexual women as 
defined by rape culture. 
Additionally, by arguing both that these "bad" women cannot or will 
not identify with and acknowledge women who say "no" (or the "real" 
survivors of sexual abuse),89 and that they do not acknowledge their own 
experiences of domination as women,90 MacKinnon implies these "bad" 
women never acknowledge saying "no" to sex. Thus, she divides women 
into two categories: 1) those who are bad, never say "no," who only 
identify pleasure with sex, and who ostensibly like to fuck; and 2) those 
good women who know that they are forced into sex and who associate 
sex, as defined by pornography, with pain and assault-women without 
desire for sexuality as constructed in our culture. This construction of 
female sexual desire mirrors that of rape culture. 91 Thus MacKinnon's 
treatment of critics as apostates serves as a devise constructing sexual 
desire, policing and dividing women. 
There do appear to be some women MacKinnon believes may be 
persuaded to change their views and follow her position despite the fact she 
believes that they deny the reality of sexual abuse of women through their 
defense of pornography. MacKinnon describes these women as being 
falsely conscious and forgetful of their experience as women before they 
became male-identified feminists. 92 MacKinnon rejects their claims of 
sexual agency or choice-defining them as false. She denies that her 
86. Id. 
87. [d. at 202 (emphasis added). 
88. [d. at 205. 
89. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. 
90. See supra text accompanying note 86. 
91. For an example of feminist critiques of MacKinnon for further dividing "good" and 
"bad" women in accordance with male hierarchy, see Ellen Willis, Feminism, Moralism & 
Pornography, in POWERS OF DESIRE 460,464 (Snitow et al. eds., 1983). 
92. MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 205. 
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critiques may have a real sense of consent and instead replaces her own 
interpretation of consent. 
As shown in the discussion of rape case law, this technique is used to 
police female agency to the male desired norm. It denies the aberration and 
thus makes it invisible. It makes sure a woman knows that if she tries to 
define her own consent outside the norm, her consent will not be respected. 
Interestingly, as in the context of rape law, MacKinnon's apparent need to 
police women's sexual agency (i.e., choice) hints at the possibility and 
reality of a true female agency outside the norm. 
In addition to constructing and policing a normative form of sexuality 
that ignores women's ability to consent and defines sexual women as 
rapable women, MacKinnon also similarly enforces heterosexuality-thus 
completing a construction of sexuality mirroring that of male-dominated 
hierarchy. 
It is not original to criticize MacKinnon for making invisible the gay 
and lesbian identity within her analysis of law and society.93 In doing so, 
she rejects the voices of many women for whom she claims to speak for. 
Legal scholar Ruthann Robson criticizes MacKinnon's gendered model of 
dominance for inaccurately portraying the lesbian experience so as to make 
it indistinguishable from the heterosexual and therefore rendering it 
invisible. She argues that in the context of lesbian battery, MacKinnon's 
tool of asking, "who is the man," rather than who is dominant-when 
interpreting the law, minimizes the complexity of the lesbian identity.94 
Such interpretation is not only underinclusive but is fundamentally 
unhelpful in assisting legal strategy aimed at curbing such violence. 95 
Although Robson's cntIcIsm of MacKinnon points to the 
underinclusiveness of MacKinnon's theory, it fails to explain why the 
lesbian experience should be made visible if MacKinnon believes the 
pornographic society she is examining and describing does not recognize or 
depict such relationships. MacKinnon's texts never challenge this 
hierarchical description of the homosexual and lesbian existence as being 
invisible or unimportant. She does not appear to desire or work toward a 
more inclusive theory of feminism. This seems inconsistent given the fact 
that she claims to speak for women who have traditionally been silenced. 
In response to such incongruency in MacKinnon's arguments, I examine 
what place lesbians and gays hold in MacKinnon's theory and description 
of the "real," as opposed to in the "male constructed." 
At most they are delegated to a footnote or a sideline sentence. In the 
93. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 202 (1989); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-
Lesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 567, 584 
(1990). 
94. See Robson, supra note 93, at 586. 
95. See id. 
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text at issue, while female sexuality is the subject of the piece, the majority 
of her original audience was female96 and she includes explicit descriptions 
of sexual conduct97 ---discussion of lesbianism is absent. Gay sex or 
homosexual pornography is alluded to twice. Within a list of harmful 
images contained within pornography, MacKinnon notes that "[l]esbian sex 
is shown as men imagine women touch each other. ,,98 Once, in a side 
comment, she notes that the anti-pornography statute she constructed with 
Andrea Dworkin providing a cause of action that would be available to all 
those who are violated through or in pornography-including men, 
transsexuals and children who (argues MacKinnon) may be violated like 
women. 99 Thus MacKinnon tersely alludes to homosexual pornography by 
insultingly lumping homosexuality together with child abuse. 
MacKinnon claims to speak for all women. She claims to be 
describing women's "truth" in juxtaposition to the normative vision of 
sexuality as created by rape-culture. But, the lack of importance she places 
on the lesbian and gay experience of many "real" women and men, as 
demonstrated by the lack of attention she spends on this subject and her 
neglect to critique the description of it offered by the dominant hierarchy, 
sends a message to gays and lesbians that their reality is unimportant in her 
description of "truth." 
She constructs an image of the reality of sexuality which does not 
allow for homosexuality, and in doing so, she renders homosexuals 
invisible. 1°O This description is normative; it is "descriptive" only in so far 
as her evaluation (her ranking of the importance of subject matter) is 
conflated with mere description of "truth." 
This analysis can be extended further when considering MacKinnon's 
evaluation of the lesbian and gay experience as unimportant alongside the 
common criticism that MacKinnon's dominance theory simply does not 
accurately or usefully describe this experience. Perhaps MacKinnon does 
not innocently or accidentally omit lesbians and gays, but does so 
intentionally because they do not fit her theory-they pose a polemic she is 
unwilling to face. The fact that MacKinnon and Dworkin added the small 
clause to their ordinance protecting people who might "sometimes" be 
treated as female, points to the fact that their gendered theory of dominance 
does not always work out quite the way the way they expect it to. 
Therefore, there is some evidence that MacKinnon's theory is not 
without fault. The fact of her exclusion (or omission) of lesbians from her 
discourse assists in preserving the unity of her theory. This all points to the 
96. Her essay was originally delivered as "part of a debate at the National Conference on 
Women and the Law in New York, Mar. 24,1985." MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 198. 
97. See id. at 205. 
98. Id. at 199. 
99. See id. at 201. 
100. Cj. Cain, supra note 93, at 211-12. 
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criticism that MacKinnon purposefully omits the experiences of some 
women in order to preserve such uniformity. At the very least, the 
homosexual experience may be strategically omitted in order to make 
MacKinnon's theory appear "truer," thereby strengthening its unifying 
force and weakening its opposition by rendering it "untrue" and therefore 
unpersuasive. Either way, MacKinnon's rhetoric cannot be seen as free of 
coercive power. Therefore, her theory is not only normative, it functions to 
exclude some women's voices in order to present a unified truth of 
women's experience. 
D. MACKINNON AS COLLABORATOR: THE DEVISIVE RESULTS 
OF FEMINISTS' NORMATIVE RHETORIC OF TRUTH 
Applying MacKinnon's own methodology to her theory of constraint, 
feminism serves to deconstruct her claims of speaking the innocent non-
exclusionary "truth." By conflating description with evaluation, by using 
only a few voices to represent all women, conveniently omitting from the 
theory any voices which disagree, and by treating any text as capable of 
creating and constructing reality-MacKinnon deploys a method of 
argument which defies testing. A bizarre conclusion that MacKinnon's 
arguments aid in constructing rape-culture cannot even be tested for the 
truth. This lack of testability, even in such an extreme case, calls into 
question the "truth" of conclusions derived from this methodology. 
Once this truth is called into question, MacKinnon's exclusion or 
omission of selected women's voices from her theory becomes suspicious. 
It loses its innocence and instead begins to indicate that exclusion is a 
technique MacKinnon uses to protect the homogeneity of her theory, to 
maintain its untestability and to keep unquestioned her claims of speaking 
the "truth." Her tactic of excluding those who criticize her begins to be 
viewed as an exercise of power and a necessary weapon to protect the 
strength of her arguments. 
As radical feminists' rhetoric of truth and their practice of defining 
critics as apostates is called into question, the possibility appears of a 
feminism that acknowledges the possibility of female "choice" and the 
constraints of male domination and the subordination of women. Yet, there 
may be political benefits to continuing to retain an exclusionary feminism. 
For example, some theorists argue that feminism must necessarily 
exclude certain women and rely on a rhetoric of exclusive truth, whether 
arguing from either choice or constraint camps, because such exclusion is 
required to preserve the appearance of a unified and "truthful" theory of 
feminism. 101 Exclusion is a necessary cost because in order to be 
101. See Harris, supra note 1, at 606-07 (1990) (citing efforts by Harvard Law School 
professor Martha Minow to maintain unifying categories of women in order to maintain a 
feminist political force); Kate Nash, The Feminist Production of Knowledge: Is 
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politically effective, feminists must be able to present themselves as a 
unified body fighting for the true and natural rights and needs of women. 102 
However, this argument presumes two theses: 1) choice or constraint 
rhetoric of truth is politically persuasive to those whom feminists want or 
need to convince to follow their lead in law reform or social change; and 2) 
an inclusive feminism of choice and constraint is not as politically 
persuasive as a choice or constraint argument by itself. I challenge this 
first assumption by formulating a satirical choice-feminist "truth" 
argument lO3 that builds upon the earlier criticism of the normative nature of 
MacKinnon's ideology for perpetuating rape culture. I then evaluate the 
persuasiveness and political feasibility of such a truth argument. 
A more sincere version of the argument that MacKinnon perpetuates 
rape-culture has been made by anti-censorship feminist and activist Marcia 
Pally in reaction to MacKinnon's pornography argument. 104 However, I do 
not seek to argue that MacKinnon's rhetoric perpetuates the abuse of 
women. Rather, this satirical "truth" argument is formulated for three 
primary reasons. First, it forces constraint feminists to experience 
themselves the upsetting experience of having their theories and arguments 
defined "false" or as collaborative in the oppression of women. Thus, it 
inverts the exclusionary power usually experienced by constraint feminists 
against others. Second, regarding the normative nature and potential for 
inversion of constraint "truth" arguments, I wish to expose choice feminists 
to this criticism as well. Third, because I believe most people will find this 
style of rhetoric lacking persuasive power once faced with an actual 
example, this satirical argument highlights the significant rhetorical 
limitations of such an exclusionary argument. 
The satirical argument that follows builds to an extreme the analysis of 
MacKinnon's work developed earlier in this Article: 
MacKinnon as Collaborator in the Oppression of Women 
MacKinnon normatively constructs a vision of female sexual 
agency which mirrors that created through rape law, and therefore 
facilitates 105 the rape of women and polices female desire to 
conform to the desires of men. 106 She divides women respectively 
into the good and the bad, the sexual and non-sexual, the unrapable 
Deconstruction a Practicefor Women?, 47 FEMINIST REv. 69,75 (1994). 
102. See Nash, supra note 101, at 75 (arguing that there is an inherent tension within 
feminist discourse between the desire to be inclusive and the need to construct a unified 
front). 
103. See supra note 8. 
104. See PALLY, supra note 29. 
105. Notice the assumption that a text has the power to construct reality. 
106. See supra Section I(C). 
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and the undesirable, those for men's use and those of no interest to 
men, without deference to the individual woman's will. 107 Only 
the male-defined norm of heterosexuality between men and 
consenting women is recognized as sexuality, as all other options 
are denied and policed. 108 
Now that MacKinnon's claim to be merely "describing" the 
objective "truth" has been deconstructed, the possibility for a 
feminist criticism emerges. No longer can she claim that 
criticizing her description of female sexuality requires a denial of 
rape victims. In fact, to oppose rape culture mandates opposition 
to MacKinnon who seeks to construct and police female sexuality 
as does rape law. 109 
Furthermore, deconstructing the "truth" of MacKinnon's 
description to show she is actively constructing and policing 
gender opens her to the additional criticism of assisting rapists in 
rationalizing their crimes. Grounding arguments and legislation on 
the premise that pornography causes violence against women, or 
that it is violence against women, removes social and individual 
culpability from the rapist who is assumed to have watched or 
imitated pornography, and places blame on the pornography 
itself. 110 If this is merely a description of the actual truth of a 
rapist's rationalizations, such criticism is warrantless. But if 
MacKinnon's theory is normative and constructive, such criticism 
gains strength. 
Such rhetoric will only aid the rapist in rationalizing a potential 
crime. As with alcohol and a batterer, a rapist can blame 
pornography for the assault. He will be able to rationalize he has a 
pornography-abuse problem, not a raping problem. For someone 
with violent propensities, such rhetoric is a dangerous tool. 
Examples have already emerged demonstrating rapists' copying of 
this rhetoric. Ted Bundy is just one example of a convicted rapist 
who, after familiarizing himself with feminist and religious anti-
pornography literature, came to blame pornography for the rapes 
he committed despite psychiatric testimony and the testimony of 
his lawyer to the contrary. III 
107. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100. 
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109. Notice the rhetoric of exclusion at work here-if you do not agree, you do not 
understand or care about the abuse of women. 
110. This portion of the argument is taken from PALLY, supra note 29. 
111. See, e. g., id. at 59-61 
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Will society really place a portion of the blame for an assault 
merely on the pornography an offender viewed before or during an 
assault? Pornography is more often than not sexual images of 
women's bodies. Therefore, some of the blame for the assault of 
the woman in the room will be blamed on the body of the woman 
pictured on the wall or on the video screen. 112 But women in the 
sex industry are disproportionately sexually abused once in the 
industry because our society makes them easy targets. 113 All too 
often the woman being victimized is the same woman found in 
pornography. Women's own bodies will be blamed for their 
assaults. 
If feminism solely concentrates on constraints placed on female 
sexuality, we will have come full circle back to arguing a woman's 
dress or appearance is reasonably linked to her own assault, to 
arguing men are not as culpable and blameworthy for rape as for 
any other violent crime, to arguing sexy women are bad women, to 
arguing women's wills should not be respected, and to forcing gays 
and lesbians back into the closet. 
The idea of MacKinnon collaborating in the oppression of women by 
creating scapegoats for rapists is likely not very persuasive to the many 
feminists who have sympathy for her arguments, as well as to many who 
do not. It is an insulting accusation backed by little, if any, empirical 
evidence. Additionally, such an accusation can also easily be reversed, as 
seen from the use of MacKinnon's own rhetoric to create this unexpected 
satirical critique of her as a collaborator. Because of its insulting and 
alienating rhetoric, and the absence of an objective empirical evidentiary 
backing, this accusation lacks persuasive force for anyone other than those 
who already agree with the point being made. 
For those who are not predisposed to such an alienating "truth" 
argument, the reaction to it is not persuasion but anger or defensiveness. 
This is evidenced by the extent to which many feminists have firmly 
entrenched themselves in a pornography debate for close to two decades. 
Even those that do not feel anger might be alienated by this rhetoric 
because there is no room within it to agree or disagree with parts of the 
discourse. Either you agree wholly, or you too are a collaborator. As there 
is no room for appeal to common ground, it is doubtful anyone would be 
convinced by this argument in changing their own feminist or political 
philosophy. 
"Better," or more politically persuasive, arguments than arguments of 
112. See id. at 63. 
113. See Jordan, supra note 17, at 180. 
III! 
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truth combined with exclusion are required for political persuasion. 114 The 
next section addresses whether a rhetoric of choice and constraint which is 
conscious of its "non-truth" (or non-innocence and its exercise of power) is 
more politically useful than a rhetoric of either choice or constraint. 
II. 
THE VALUE AND VALIDITY OF AN INCLUSIVE FEMINIST 
JURISPRUDENCE: PROSTITUTES AS AUTOBIOGRAPHERS. 
In investigating whether a rhetoric of choice and constraint would be 
politically feasible, or at least more feasible and persuasive, than truth 
rhetoric of either choice or constraint, it is necessary to ask what or who 
should be the focus or subject matter of such a feminist jurisprudence. It is 
not clear whether the focus of such a jurisprudence would differ from that 
of either choice or constraint rhetoric. 
Although I have a desire to maintain and embrace both choice and 
constraint rhetoric, a critique of both discourses is necessary to expose their 
exclusive and incomplete qualities. An investigation of this notion of a 
changing feminist focus is undertaken in this section by searching within 
both of these individual discourses for a topic which, although allegedly 
discussed frequently, does not seem to be satisfactorily addressed by either 
discourse. Once identified, I then seek to examine how a rhetoric of both 
choice and constraint, which is mindful of its own exercise of power, 
would affect the treatment of this subject. 
By "satisfactorily discussed" I mean that there is confusion and 
contradiction concerning how each school of thought perceives its own 
coverage of the subject. The perfect topic to illustrate the dichotomy is one 
which interests both choice and constraint feminists, one which they both 
seem to embrace as a topic of concern, but which ultimately both fail to 
explore adequately or effectively. As already argued, such exclusions (or 
failures to address complications or inadequacies) on the part of choice or 
constraint feminists are used to maintain an appearance of a uniform 
constituency or theory. Therefore, a theory simultaneously rejected by 
both schools of thought may have elements of both schools within it. 
Finding such a topic may provide clues as to the types of subject matter 
with which a feminist of both choice and constraint would be concerned. 
Based on these criteria, the "bad" woman or prostitute proves a fitting 
subject for study. This section argues that, although both constraint and 
choice feminists claim to be interested in helping sexual women and/or 
prostitutes and respecting their voices, the actual rhetoric of either of these 
114. See Nash, supra note 101, at 72-73 (arguing that in the absence of a rhetoric of truth, 
in order to be persuasive, feminists must create "good reasons" which appeal to the belief 
structure of their audience). 
W'f!l!!'ftM Ht"m!''''.1 IJ 
164 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10: 1 
strains taken individually functions to silence and ignore the concerns of 
these women. The fact that the prostitute's voice is simultaneously rejected 
from both constraint and choice discourses serves to indicate that the 
prostitute's voice itself cannot fit into either alone. Thus it appears that this 
is an area where a rhetoric of both choice and constraint may improve 
feminists' ability to communicate and acknowledge the concerns of a 
distinct population of women. 
This Section then transitions to examine the prostitute's voice, 
unclouded by feminist translation, through an analysis of contemporary 
prostitute autobiographies. This examination gives additional clues 
indicating the need for a rhetoric that simultaneously allows for discourse 
of choice and constraint. It is through this analysis that the possibility and 
benefits of a more inclusive rhetoric of choice within constraint becomes 
clearer. An inclusive feminism which carries with it a consciousness of 
exclusion as a form of power can lead to a new way of structuring 
arguments so as to avoid conflicts between women, and thus create a truly 
powerful and inclusive polity. However, in order to create these new 
arguments, it may be necessary for feminists to completely remove their 
focus away from female freedom or limitation, and to move towards asking 
what can be done to reduce or alter conditions within which people 
experience oppression. 
Before getting to the heart of this argument, an explanation of the 
unsatisfactory nature of either constraint or choice rhetoric in describing 
the prostitute and in improving her life is needed. This explanation begins 
by discussing choice feminism's representation of the sexual woman. For 
purposes of this argument, writer Katie Roiphe has been chosen to 
represent the choice feminist point of view because, although she has only 
written one book,115 she has gained notoriety in the press for her views 116 
and therefore has been able to educate much of the public with an extremist 
choice feminism position. 
Katie Roiphe, like many choice oriented truth feminists, attempts to 
discredit her opposition by labeling their efforts against sexual assault as 
being grounded in and perpetuating the infantalization of women 117 (or as 
defining women as the inherently innocent sex 118). In a creative rhetorical 
strategy, Roiphe redefines the platform of the anti-rape movement to work 
against itself, redefining "rape crisis" to refer to an epidemic rather than a 
psychological state of an individual. 119 Through her relabeling, and claims 
115. See KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 
(1993). 
116. Katie Roiphe appeared on numerous television morning and talk shows to launch her 
book, THE MORNING AfTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993). For an example 
of her access to mainstream media, see Roiphe, supra note 16. 
117. See Roiphie, supra note 16, at 5-6. 
118. See id. at 6. 
119. See id. at 26. 
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that rape crisis is grounded in paternalistic motivations, she creates a 
picture of the rape-crisis counselor as hysterical, Victorian, Ivy League, 
anti-sex and asexual 120_a picture which appeals powerfully to the 
reactionary far right and others in denial of sexual abuse. Unfortunately, as 
a result of her strategy, time and energy must now be wasted fighting this 
construct rather than helping women. 
Through this redefining process, Roiphe further damages the fight for 
female sexuality free from sexual assault. She reconstructs the meaning of 
date-rape story literature, usually taking the form of date-rape awareness 
pamphlets, to be stories of lost female innocence and as developing images 
of women as virginal children who are easily conned. 121 Having personally 
compiled stories for such literature and brochures, my intent was far from 
her description. The intent is to create sympathy for, empathize with and 
recognize the "real" rape of not always perfectly "good" girls. The reader 
of such literature is meant to go away thinking that a woman can go to a 
man's room alone, walk down the street at night, enjoy a conversation with 
a man, have foreplay with a man, agree to have safe sex with a man and 
then later refuse when he will not wear a condom, or even run down the 
street naked and not deserve to be raped. The stories are aimed at giving 
voice to the non-innocent woman and the stories of rape of "bad girls." 
Roiphe's relabeling, rather than giving women tools for expression, makes 
invisible the reality of the sexual women she wishes to defend. 
Female agency (or choice) cannot and will not be fully realized until 
female sexuality ceases to be policed through sexual violence. Sexual 
violence is a reality for many women who boldly assert their sexuality in 
today's world. 122 Roiphe does not prevent sexual violence against women 
by denying the existence of these women's rapes. Ironically, although 
Roiphe desires a world which respects and recognizes female sexual 
agency, her extremist "choice" rhetoric frustrates this end by ignoring 
women's experience of rape-denying rather than removing the constraints 
on their ability to exercise their sexuality. Women should be able to have 
great sex, passionate sex, even rough sex, but only when and with whom 
they want it. 
Similar to Roiphe's rhetorical style, radical feminists Catharine 
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin have redefined pornography and 
prostitution as inherently non-consensual. 123 Thus, they have made anyone 
who defends prostitution or pornography subject to accusations of 
insensiti vity toward, or even collaboration with, women's abuse. Rather 
than claiming to facilitate the sexual abuse and blame of women in the sex 
industry for their own assaults, as alluded to above, MacKinnon and 
120. See id. at 8-9. 
121. See id. 
122. See Kennedy, supra note 17; Jordan, supra note 17, at 180. 
123. See DWORKIN & MACKiNNON, supra note 24, at 38-39. 
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Dworkin claim they have the best interests of sex workers in mind, and 
frequently refer to their support of the claims of abuse of former 
pornography actress Linda (Lovelace) Marchiano to support this claim. 124 
Yet they alienate sex workers from the feminist community by describing 
women who continue to work in the industry as either brainwashed, falsely 
conscious, or as collaborators in the oppression of women. 125 As 
previously discussed, besides being condescending and insulting, this 
rhetoric merely reinforces stereotypes of bad women or sexy women as 
brainless women, a stereotype feminism must challenge. 
MacKinnon and Dworkin further alienate their cause from that of at 
least some sex workers by rejecting or sabotaging any claims or 
movements toward self-empowerment made by sex workers. For example, 
one of their definitions of what was to be considered pornography, or 
sexual subordination, in the draft of their model anti-pornography statute 
proposed in Minneapolis, and later in Los Angeles County, was pictures or 
descriptions of women portrayed as "whores.,,126 In 1985, a group of 
prostitutes and their supporters founded the International Committee for 
Prostitutes Rights (ICPR) which is based in the Netherlands. This 
organization sponsored the First and Second World Whores' Congresses in 
Amsterdam in 1985 and Brussels in 1986. It also drafted the International 
Committee for Prostitutes' Rights World Charter and World Whores' 
Congress Statements, arguing prostitutes' rights deserve protection under 
international human rights law. 127 These conferences and statements 
contain the word "whore" and describe prostitutes as whores. Yet the goal 
of the ICPR is to give dignity to prostitutes, not to degrade them. 
Ironically, by MacKinnon and Dworkin's definition, these prostitutes' 
attempts at self empowerment and embracing of the label "whore" falls into 
the category of sexual subordination.128 
Despite claims and intentions to the contrary, the rhetoric of both 
choice and constraint feminists silences the experience of the sexual 
woman, or socially labeled deviant, and therefore limits her ability to have 
a voice in feminist jurisprudence. MacKinnon and Dworkin deny such 
women self-determination, and Roiphe denies their true experiences of 
sexual assault. Such rejection or silencing is a rhetorical technique 
employed by both strands of feminism to maintain the homogeneity and 
appearance of the truth of their independent theories of female nature. 
124. See MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 127. 
125. See MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 198, 199, 200-01, 205 (arguing women who 
support the pornography industry by being part of it are either ignorant of women's 
oppression or have an interest in the further subordination of other women). 
126. See Andrea Dworkin & Catharine A. MacKinnon, Proposed Los Angeles County 
Anti-Pornography Civil Rights Law, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES-COMMENTS-
QUESTIONS 190, 191 (Steven H. Shiffrin & Jesse H. Choper eds., 1991). 
127. Text reprinted in SEX WORK, supra note 5, at 305-21. 
128. See Dworkin & MacKinnon, supra note 126, at 191. 
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Moreover, because choice and constraint feminisms are described as 
antithetical, each group's rejection of these women's voices points to the 
inclusion of elements of the other view in their stories. MacKinnon and 
Dworkin's rejection of these women's self-empowerment hints at these 
women's actual agency or choice. Likewise, Roiphe' s denial of women's 
experience and vulnerability to sexual assault actually serves to recognize 
the constraints placed on all women's ability to exercise free choice. The 
dual rejection of women's sexual reality from the constraint and choice 
discourses indicates that this is an area where choice and constraint rhetoric 
needs to work together for an accurate depiction and understanding of 
women's lives and needs. 
Examining how prostitutes describe their own reality further 
demonstrates the importance and utility of an inclusive feminism of choice 
within constraint. 
A. HISTORY OF PROSTITUTE AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 
In the past decade there has been a large increase in the number of 
autobiographies written by women in the sex industry.129 These books are 
the result of prostitutes' frustration with research conducted on them, not 
for them, by social scientists foreign to sex work. l30 
Throughout the prostitute rights movements of the 1970s and 1980s, 
social theorists of all sorts have been criticized for creating a false picture 
of the prostitute.l31 Autobiographies have been used by many authors to 
demonstrate, by their own example, that prostitutes are not deviant or 
somehow inherently different from the rest of society.l32 Their description 
of the prostitute contrasts with that of earlier predominantly male social 
theorists who looked for causes of prostitution either in women's biology 
or psyche. These earlier theorists "viewed involvement in prostitution as 
indicative of some form of underlying pathology."l33 
Feminists are also commonly challenged by prostitutes for failing to 
accurately portray the prostitute's reality. Prostitutes charge feminists with 
ignoring prostitutes' own stories and refusing to take seriously women's 
interpretations of their own experiences. 
[Prostitute women] claim that their reality has been ignored by 
feminism and by society, and that feminism in particular is 
129. See ROBERTA PERKINS, WORKING GIRLS: PROSTITUTES, THEIR LIFE AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL 46 (1991). 
130. See, e.g., SEX WORK, supra note 5; PROSTITUTES-OUR LIFE (Claude Jaget ed., 1980) 
[hereinafter PROSTITUTES]; PERKINS, supra note 128; NICKIE ROBERTS, THE FRONT LINE: 
WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY SPEAK (1986). 
131. See, e.g., supra note 130. 
132. See, e.g., SEX WORK, supra note 5; PROSTITUTES, supra note 130; GLORIA LoVATT & 
PAM COCKERILL, A NICE GIRL LIKE ME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GLORIA LoVATT (1988); 
ROBERTS, supra note 130. 
133. Jordan, supra note 17, at 184. 
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incomplete until it integrates their experience . ... If feminism 
claims to support women making choices and wishes to create a 
world view that incorporates women's reality, then the voices of 
the women who practice the world's 'oldest professions' must be 
heard. 134 
However, despite their anger at being unrealistically or inaccurately 
portrayed, it is unclear how prostitutes collectively wish to be described. 
For example, Margo St. James, founder of COYOTE (Call off Your Old 
Tired Ethics, a prostitute rights organization) "[r]ejects the patronizing 
attitude of society and some feminists that sex trade workers are destroyed 
by their work .... " 135 Yet prostitutes Margaret Valentino and Mavis 
Johnson criticize feminists for describing prostitutes as leading a 
"glamorous" life without problems. 136 Thus the rhetoric of prostitutes 
themselves, as with that of feminist jurisprudence, may be divided between 
consideration of choice and constraint. 
Prostitutes might also be reacting against the singular foci of the 
individual feminists describing them. This confusion among the prostitute 
critique of feminist jurisprudence may result from prostitutes wanting to 
criticize choice feminists for not considering constraint and vice versa. 
Without a combined feminist jurisprudence, the prostitute critic must 
become divided in order to address a divided discourse of feminist 
jurisprudence of either choice or constraint. There is no room within 
contemporary debate for a discourse of both choice and constraint. 
However, in studying the voice of prostitute women, the importance and 
political viability of a feminism of choice and constraint is made possible. 
The increase in numbers of prostitutes publishing their own stories has 
triggered much criticism focusing on the validity and value to 
jurisprudence both of autobiographies or narratives generally, and of 
prostitute autobiographies specifically. 137 The examination of the validity 
and significant value of prostitute autobiographies to law reform 
movements begins by examining whether prostitutes' insights into their 
own behavior should be taken seriously, or whether because of their 
proximity to prostitution, they are unable to accurately and completely 
portray their own involvement in the business. 
Assuming prostitute women's autobiographies give a valid account of 
134. Susanne N. Frost, 4 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 597, 598 (1991) (reviewing GOOD GIRLS, 
BAD GIRLS: SEX TRADE WORKERS AND FEMINISTS FACE TO FACE (Laurie Bell ed., 1987)). 
135. [d. at 600. 
136. See Margaret Valentino & Mavis Johnson, On the Game and On the Move, in 
PROSTITUTES, supra note 130, at 9-10. 
137. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 17, at 187-90 (outlining radical feminist criticism of the 
validity of prostitute autobiographies); Howard S. Becker, The Relevance of Life Histories, 
in SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS: A SOURCEBOOK 419, 420 (Norman K. Denzin ed., 1970) 
(critiquing autobiographies as a legitimate social science tool). 
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women's lives in prostitution and the feminist implications of their 
behavior, there still remains a question as to what value these 
autobiographies contribute to literature on prostitution. This question is 
analyzed here through examination of a small sample of six such 
autobiographies. It is true that variables limit the usefulness of these 
stories: including the inability to generalize from one individual's 
experiences; the lack of analysis or insight accompanying the description of 
the women's lives; and the apparent absence of new perspectives 
contributed by the authors which contrast with or compliment 
contemporary social theory of prostitution. However, by failing to look 
beyond these limiting variables, critics often simplify and obscure the real 
value of these texts. Their true value is not in generalizing their 
conclusions, their representiveness, or in being complete and accurate, but 
in that they create a forum which both builds solidarity between women 
sharing the experience of working in the sex industry as well as facilitates a 
broad-based public debate and review of law. A feminism of both choice 
and constraint would be able to take advantage of these benefits of the 
prostitute voice by altering the foci of feminism in a way mere choice or 
constraint rhetoric would be incapable of duplicating. 
B. VALIDITY OF AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 
The ability of prostitutes to accurately depict their lives and the 
implications of their behavior, has been attacked by many social theorists. 
On the most basic level, the validity of autobiographies in general is often 
questioned. For example, many social theorists, such as Howard S. Becker 
have attacked the validity of the use of autobiographies in social science 
because they are seen as biased and incomplete. 
When we read an autobiography ... we are always aware that the 
author is telling us only part of the story, that he has selected his 
material so as to present us with the picture of himself he would 
prefer us to have and that he may have ignored what would be 
trivia or distasteful to him, though of great interest to US.138 
Yet all social science research contains the biases of the researcher. 139 
Furthermore, even Becker admits all research is limited in its scope: "We 
do not expect ... that anyone piece of work will give us all the answers, or 
indeed, all of anyone answer.,,140 
Thus, dismissing autobiographies simply because the portrait of the 
subject or author they present is limited and possibly biased, when such 
criticism plagues all of social science, is erroneous and an overly simplistic 
138. Becker, supra note 137, at 420. 
139. See KEN PLUMMER, DOCUMENTS OF LIFE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS AND 
LITERATURE OF A HUMANISTIC METHOD 10 (1983). 
140. Becker, supra note 137, at 422. 
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criticism of the validity of autobiographies. 
A more complex criticism of the use of autobiographies to inform 
arguments concerning prostitution would challenge the ability of prostitutes 
specifically to accurately portray their role in prostitution. Radical 
feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon claim that prostitute women's 
proximity to a business run expressly for the sexual gratification of men 
renders them unable to separate the views and beliefs of their male 
oppressors from the reality of their situation. Sociologist Jan Jordan 
summarizes this perspective of MacKinnon. 
[I]t is men's control over women as sexual beings which is viewed 
as the basis of male dominance . .. Prostitution represents one of 
the most overt forms of such control .... 
For radical feminists, then, prostitution is central to male 
dominance . .. Inherent within it is the subordination of women, 
yet it will often be impossible for women to recognize such 
oppression given the hegemony of the male perspective. As 
MacKinnon sees it: 
The perspective from the male standpoint enforces women's 
definition, encircles her body, circumlocutes her speech, and 
describes her life. The male perspective is systemic and 
hegemonic. 141 
Ultimately women are unable even to perceive what would be in their 
own interest, since awareness of "self' has been colonized to such an extent 
that they see their own needs simply as a reflection of male desire-" ... 
there is no such thing as a woman as such, there are only walking 
embodiments of men's projected needs". 142 Thus, because of their 
involvement in a business which markets and enhances the sexual 
oppression of women, prostitutes cannot objectively and truly evaluate 
their own behavior. 
At close examination, this argument suffers from two fundamental 
flaws. At the extreme, such an argument implies that no woman can 
closely examine or become involved in the sex industry from a non-male-
dominated perspective because, as part of society, all women's conceptions 
(including those of the social researcher) mirror the dominant male 
perspective. Thus the same feminists, including MacKinnon, who purport 
such theories of hegemonic male dominance, and who also find fault with 
how their male predecessors have analyzed prostitution, should be by their 
141. Jordan, supra note 17, at 188, quoting Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, 
Method, and the State: Towards Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 635-36 (1983). 
142. Jordan, supra note 17, at 188, quoting Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, 
Method, and the State: An Agendafor Theory, 7 SIGNS 515,534 (1982). 
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definition unable to examine prostitution without regurgitating the same 
conclusions reached by their male predecessors. If this argument were true, 
MacKinnon would be in effect admitting she is a collaborator in the 
oppression of women, or that she does espouse and help to construct the 
male domination of women. This argument appears overly simplistic. 
Additionally, even if this theory is true and prostitutes' accounts 
reiterate the dominant male perspective, and MacKinnon's do not, it 
remains an oversimplification to claim prostitutes' autobiographies are 
therefore "invalid." Just as MacKinnon's theory itself constitutes one 
normative vision of what "is," prostitutes' voices are no less valid, but 
simply derived from a different perspective. In this case, the 
autobiographies would serve as a convenient and useful window through 
which feminists can view and understand the male hierarchy. The resulting 
portrayals would not be invalid, they would just not be feminist portrayals 
of prostitution, perhaps consisting instead of sexist portrayals of the sex 
industry. 
Interestingly, within their autobiographies, some sex workers present a 
similar argument to those of radical feminists. They agree that prostitutes 
are unable to accurately describe their situation and that prostitutes are 
unable to understand the implications of their behavior. June Levine 
elaborates on this argument in the preface to Lyn Madden's autobiography. 
My experience with Lyn has taught me that an exploited woman 
often does not realise the reality of her life. It is not that a woman 
in Lyn's situation lies to herself. But, by its very nature, the life of 
prostitution compels her to 'cut off from feeling. . .. And the 
perfect cut off, as described by the psychiatrist and writer R. D. 
Laing, is so perfect that one does not know one is cut off .... 
In the past ... most of what [Lyn] ... said intellectualised her 
experience of prostitution . . .. Today, her perceptions are 
different. 143 
Later in the text, Lyn herself confirms that not until undergoing therapy 
was she able to accurately describe the implications of her prostituting 
behavior. 144 
However, for methodological consistency, this autobiography must be 
viewed with the same scrutiny and skepticism as those of prostitutes who 
claim prostitutes are able to speak validly of their own behavior. Simply 
because this autobiography agrees with arguments made by radical 
feminists and other social theorists does not make it more valid than other 
autobiographies. MacKinnon makes this sort of fallacious assumption 
143. JUNE LEVINE & LYN MADDEN, LYN: A STORY OF PROSTITUTION 8 (1987). 
144. See id. at 8. 
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when quoting and presenting as valid the autobiography of ex-porn star 
Linda Marchiano. 145 MacKinnon rejects the arguments and self-reflection 
of sex workers who disagree with her findings, claiming their views are the 
result of indoctrination with sexist ideology.146 Yet for some reason, 
MacKinnon distinguishes Marchiano's story as valid. 147 Absent 
clarification, it appears MacKinnon makes this distinction merely because 
Marchiano's argument concerning male hegemony supports that of 
MacKinnon. Therefore, MacKinnon's cntIcism of prostitute 
autobiographies can be seen as the result of her exercising evaluative power 
and excluding those women's voices which challenge the homogeneity of 
her theory. 
For methodological consistency, all prostitute autobiographies must be 
approached as containing biases despite whether they agree with or argue 
against other theorists' writings on prostitution. All autobiographies fail to 
give a complete and unbiased picture of the subjects' lives. However, this 
fault is true of any qualitative work. 148 Prostitute autobiographies serve 
both as a valid window through which to view the biases included within 
their text, and when correcting for these biases, as a valid source of 
information on prostitution. 
C. VALUE OF AUTOBIOGRAPIDES 
Even if autobiographies are accepted as a valid social science medium, 
there still exists the problem of determining the value of these 
autobiographies. Prostitute autobiographies do not allow for generalization 
and few are developed beyond a descriptive account of the woman's life, 
including minimal theorizing or analysis. 149 Furthermore, it is unclear 
whether prostitute autobiographies present unique arguments not already 
widespread within prostitution literature. 
In order to examine these three criticisms, a sample of six 
autobiographies and collections of prostitute women's stories are analyzed 
as to how their authors address these three obstacles in developing their 
arguments. 150 The six books represent the stories of a wide range of sex 
workers from a variety of Western countries. This sample was purposely 
chosen in a non-random fashion as the existence of innumerable potentially 
confounding variables such as race, class, age, type of sex work performed, 
145. See MacKinnon, supra note 142, at 539. 
146. See supra text accompanying notes 141-142. 
147. Catharine A. MacKinnon outlines her support for Linda Marchiano in linda's life 
and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 19, at 127. 
148. See PLUMMER, supra note 139, at 10. 
149. See Belinda Carpenter, The Crunch Point: Exploring the Relationship Between 
Feminists and Prostitutes and Feminists and Prostitution, paper presented at TASA 
Sociological Conference (1990), cited in Jordan, supra note 17, at 187. 
150. The books sampled are: SEX WORK, supra note 5; PROSTITUTES, supra note 130; 
LEVINE & MADDEN, supra note 143; LoVATI & COCKERILL, supra note 132; MELISSA, THE 
HARLOT'S ROOM (1987); ROBERTS, supra note 130. 
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upbringing and nationality affect these stories, making a controlled choice 
for most variables virtually impossible, and most likely inaccurate. The 
only variable controlled for, that the authors all worked in sex industries in 
Western countries, was not controlled by choice but by scarcity of subject 
matter. Although this sample may not be representative, it is still possible 
to use the sample in order to pinpoint argumentative trends, and to form a 
theory explaining the value prostitute autobiographies provide to the 
current literature on prostitution. 
These six autobiographies fail to include any generalizations and very 
little theory building, with one exception: editor Claude J aget' s 
Prostitutes-Our Lives. This unique book is centered on the sweeping 
assumption that women's low economic status in male-dominated 
capitalistic society causes prostitution. 151 Poverty forces women to become 
and remain prostitutes. 152 No allowance is made for the possibility of 
women entering prostitution for any other reason. And it assumes 
prostitution will disappear completely with the fall of capitalism. 153 This 
book, however, also includes life stories of a group of women and spokes-
people from European prostitute collectives. Therefore, the generalizations 
are not based merely on the autobiography of a lone individual. 
In The Front Line: Women in the Sex Industry Speak, Nickie Roberts 
also theorizes that women's general status of poverty in society forced her 
(and other women she knew) into the sex industry.154 Yet she recognizes 
that she is unable to generalize any conclusions from only her experience, 
stating that without the voices of other sex workers, her autobiography 
"could be dismissed as the experience of one individual, a token 
stripper." 155 
Whether the lack of general causal theories of prostitution derived from 
prostitute autobiographies either prohibits or justifies reliance on 
autobiographies in feminist jurisprudence can be determined through 
examination of the authors' goals in writing these books. Are they 
presenting a view or stance different from, or a valuable addition to, what 
has already been written on prostitution? Roberta Perkins summarizes the 
common aim of prostitutes in writing their autobiographies. 
Some [of the prostitute autobiographies] have feminist orientations, 
others have other political intentions, but all make an appeal for 
human rights based on a non-deviant argument for prostitutes. 
They have been inspired by the prostitutes' movement since 1975, 
and are more concerned for circumstances affecting prostitutes in 
151. See PROSTITUTES, supra note 130, at 11. 
152. See id. 
153. See id. at 30-31. 
154. See ROBERTS, supra note 130, at 16. 
155. !d. at 19. 
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their work than for causal factors .... 156 
While the autobiographies are written from a variety of perspectives, 
Perkins claims that they all include arguments for an anti-deviant 
description of prostitutes, and a plea for social involvement in improving 
the plight of the prostitute. 157 The authors of the six autobiographies 
sampled in this paper all appear to share these two common goals. 
However, not all the authors argue them successfully. In order to 
demonstrate this point it is necessary to examine these two goals 
indi vidually. 
The first intention of the majority of the authors is to demonstrate, 
through their own example, that prostitutes are not deviant or somehow 
inherently different from the rest of society. Despite the prostitute 
autobiographers' articulated goal of rejecting the definition of prostitute as 
pathological deviant, in reality most of the authors continue to describe 
themselves in this way. 
Some of the sampled autobiographers make no pretense to describe 
themselves in a non-pathological light. For example, Lyn Madden (Lyn: A 
Story of Prostitution) and Melissa (The Harlot's Room) both set out to 
describe their prostituting behavior as resulting from their psychological 
problems. Yet even authors who deny inherent pathology forces women 
into crime, often present their own behavior as being the result of 
determinant variables over which they have no control. 
Gloria Lovatt denies she or any other woman was "born a 
prostitute." 158 She continues on to argue that "it doesn't always take a 
special sort of girl to walk the streets, just a special sort of childhood.,,159 
Thus despite Lovatt's desire to portray herself as no different or deviant 
from any other woman, she does just this by differentiating between 
women from "normal" backgrounds and prostitute women who are the 
result of abusive childhoods. While she is not inherently deviant due to her 
biological, psychological or sexual nature, she is still differentiated from 
society because of her background of sexual abuse which forced her into 
prostitution. Lovatt merely replaces biological or psychological 
determinism with social determinism when explaining her criminality and 
deviance. 
A similar replacement occurs in writings by members of the English 
Collective of Prostitutes (ECP).I60 Members of the ECP hold a radical 
criminological perspective toward prostitution in that they see the business 
of prostitution as well as the roles of prostitute and client as resulting from 
156. PERKINS, supra note 129, at 46. 
157. See id. 
158. See LOVATT & COCKERILL, supra note 132, at 14. 
159. Id. 
160. See PROSTITUTES, supra note 130; ROBERTS, supra note 130. 
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and reflecting current economic circumstances. 161 These prostitutes believe 
"prostitution would disappear altogether if classism, and the closely related 
caste system of racism, disappeared.,,162 Furthermore, while they reject the 
notion of biological or psychological determinants forcing a woman into 
prostitution, they do "believe that poverty forces poor women to work in 
the sex industry.,,163 Thus again, as with Levine and Madden's book, these 
prostitutes set out to redefine the prostitute as non-deviant yet they continue 
to differentiate between the determined prostitute, victimized by her 
socio/economic environment, and the self-determined, rational, non-
prostitute. 
Up until this point, this argument is functioning under the presumption 
that a woman who acknowledges and vocalizes knowledge of the 
constraints on her life cannot still have some agency within these 
constraints. Yet it is not necessary to assume that the prostitute 
autobiographers fail to define themselves as non-deviant merely because 
they recognize socio-economic forces within which they have had to make 
their choices. Only if one reads these autobiographies as necessarily 
proving the truth of either agency (choice) or determination (constraint) 
must a reading reach this conclusion. If one allows oneself to open their 
discourse to include choice and constraint, then these autobiographies can 
be seen as providing invaluable insight into how individuals view their 
ability to make choices within constraints. 
Clearly these authors are trying to achieve something new. They have 
gone out of their way to produce autobiographies and to have them 
published. This desire to have their voice heard goes far beyond agreeing 
to give a feminist researcher an interview. These autobiographies were 
made out of a desire to be heard after multitudes of prostitutes agreed to be 
interviewed, but whose voices remained unheard in the contemporary 
feminist discourse which allows only constraint or choice rhetoric. To 
approach these autobiographies with this exclusive feminist methodology 
intact again renders silent the prostitute voice. But to read these texts with 
the desire to find surprise, to be open to contradictions which may not in 
fact be contradictory, allows One to see evidence that maybe people 
including prostitutes do see themselves as existing and exercising agency 
within a system of constraints. Perhaps feminism would become more 
accurate and inclusive if we were to respect these self-descriptions. 
Perhaps the most valuable contribution the prostitute autobiography 
can make to feminist jurisprudence is a portrayal of women who exercise 
choice within constraint. This portrayal opens up the possibility of a 
rhetoric or discourse to explain how women exercise agency within 
constraints. 
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Examining the prostitute autobiography also points to the possibility of 
political power to be gained through such a rhetoric of choice within 
constraint. A second significant contribution these books make toward the 
prostitute literature is found in their potential appeal for social awareness of 
circumstances, laws and policy effecting prostitutes. Demonstrating to the 
public how an individual, a real person, is affected by prostitution law and 
policy is likely a powerful instigator of social reform. 
The historical reliance by social theorists on autobiographies and case 
studies, when hoping to encourage social reform, is traced by sociologist 
James Bennett through his analysis of studies of juvenile delinquency: 
"[Autobiographies] become fashionable when the main features of their 
social experiences need to be communicated in order to attract support for 
projects of social reform from professionals and members of the public." 164 
Prostitute autobiographies further exemplify this trend. Eileen McLeod 
summarizes the impact prostitute women's stories have had on prostitution 
reform and public attitude towards prostitution. 
[P]ublic attention has only recently been redirected towards the 
idea that the origins of prostitution lie in the sorts of social 
problems experienced by men and women .... 
. . . [T]his change in public attention has mainly come about as a 
result of the advent of prostitutes' campaign since the mid 
seventies. Prostitution is now a matter of public debate because 
prostitutes have come out publicly ... to further their cause rather 
than to foment scandal. 165 
Thus prostitute autobiographies have encouraged public debate and social 
reform. 
The power of the prostitute movement in re-educating and informing 
the public of the prostitute experience is enhanced by the solidarity 
between prostitute women. It arises from the ability to write the stories of 
their lives for each other. 166 Unlike feminists arguing from an exclusive 
rhetoric of truth that alienates women who disagree in order to maintain an 
appearance of truth and uniformity; prostitutes who have embraced a 
rhetoric of choice within constraint do not argue from just one truth. 167 
They accept the notion that women's lives vary.168 Thus their rhetoric of 
openness actually helps them achieve a politically powerful unification. 
Although the value of uniting sex workers through their common 
164. JAMES BENNETT, ORAL HISTORY AND DELINQUENCY: THE RHETORIC OF 
CRIMINOLOGY 2 (1981). 
165. EILEEN MCLEOD, WOMEN WORKING: PROSTITUTION Now 2 (1982). 
166. See ROBERTS, supra note 130, at 14. 
167. See supra text accompanying note 149. 
168. See id. 
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experiences, or simply being able to read that they are not the only ones in 
their situation, is mentioned in all but one 169 of the sampled 
autobiographies, its value is ignored by social theorists. 
This opportunity for prostitute women to unite, and therefore to gain 
political solidarity and power, increases with the lack of analysis and 
generalizations made within prostitute autobiographies. Only in books 
criticized for "failing to move beyond the descriptive, and for contenting 
themselves with chronicling the industry in ways often contradictory,,,170 
can a large group of seemingly unrelated women come together to share 
their life stories. 
Moreover, when there are no generalizations made, or even possible, a 
broad range of women can celebrate their diversity, making it possible to 
portray to the public how law and social attitudes affect every type of sex 
worker. These diverse autobiographies portray a reality of diverse 
experiences with which the public and other prostitutes can find elements 
to identify with. Thus mass accounts of the sex industry, which are often 
contradictory, demonstrate the new and valuable impact prostitute 
autobiographies can have on current prostitution literature and social 
policy, and it would not be possible without giving prostitute women their 
own voices. 
Ironically, the political power of the prostitution movement may be 
enhanced by the very pathological assumptions made by the general public 
concerning prostitutes. Because society in general defmes prostitutes as 
"different," and certainly as non-intellectual, their writings are arguably 
non-threatening. Moreover, it is likely their writings are assumed to be 
titillating-almost pornographic or reminiscent of a romance novel. Thus 
the low status prostitutes hold in society may render their writings highly 
approachable as low-brow popular culture. This would increase these 
autobiographies accessibility to a wide range of people certainly making 
them more readily accessible than traditional feminist theory. Thus the 
subordination and the social stigma of the prostitute may grant the 
prostitute a form of literary power via the broad-based audience she 
attracts. 
D. THE VALUE OF AN INCLUSIVE FEMINIST VOICE 
Yet how broad do we want to open up feminist jurisprudence? How 
far are we willing to go to be politically persuasive?171 
169. See MELISSA, THE HARLOT'S ROOM, supra note 150. 
170. Jordan, supra note 17, at 187. 
171. I use the term "we" sarcastically because in this context it implies that feminists, 
particularly feminist lawyers, academics or activists are not prostitutes. I do not believe 
such a clear division between different types of women exists. However, this assumption 
runs rampant throughout the feminist prostitution and pornography literature. See, e.g., 
MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 205 (MacKinnon states that she doesn't "see a lot of women 
lawyers, feminists or otherwise, selling their asses on the street or looking for a 
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The example of the prostitute autobiography demonstrates the 
possibility and potential political benefits of an inclusive feminism 
recognizing women's ability to make choices within constraints. Yet such 
deconstructionist methodology insists that this new rhetoric not ignore nor 
avoid its responsibility for exercising power through the exclusion of some 
women from its discourse. The political power described above does not 
come without costs. 
Although recommending destabilizing and challenging the claims of 
truth within discourses, I do not support relativism. As feminists we still 
will maintain sets of beliefs. And our feminist beliefs are based on good 
reasoning. l72 Yet any feminist strategy must be conscious of its exclusion 
of some women for the offensiveness of their feminist beliefs. 
The potential power of prostitute autobiographies gained through the 
accessibility of their titillating content was mentioned above. However, 
there are at least a few feminists who would not like to depend for political 
power and support on the lustful and subordinating desires of a man who 
out of desire for sex and power decides to gawk at a prostitute's 
autobiography. Additionally, if one believes that prostitution is 
fundamentally oppressive and abusive of women, then one would not want 
to encourage or support women's choices in choosing prostitution. Thus 
even when attempting to create an inclusive feminism of choice within 
constraint which can account for a wide range of women's experience, 
there will inevitably always be a conflict between women. One group will 
exclude another. 
However, such exclusion is less likely within a feminist discourse 
which is conscious of its ability to exercise power to exclude and the 
divisive consequences of exercising such power. Exclusion is less likely 
with a feminism founded on the assumption that solidarity and inclusion is 
ultimately politically desirable, than in a rhetoric of truth which hides and 
denies its exercise of power to exclude. Understanding and trying to 
reconcile the conflict between the desire to be unified, and creating a 
diversity that pulls feminists apart, will at least give feminists the option 
and the chance to find ways around impending conflict. If exclusionary 
power is denied, no one can act to avoid conflicts which may lead to a 
pornographer with a camera in order to fulfill their sexual agency .... "). See also, GOOD 
GIRLS-BAD GIRLS: FEMINISTS AND SEX TRADE WORKERS FACE TO FACE (Laurie Bell ed. 
1987) (implying by the title a dichotomy separating feminists from sex workers). In 
contrast, one of the few studies performed in the United States based on a representative 
sampling of prostitutes for range of sex work performed (i.e., prostitutes sampled worked as 
street prostitutes, call-girls, escorts and independent contractors) found that the only 
significant differences between prostitute and non-prostitute women included that 
prostitutes were likely to be more highly educated, and tended to have greater self-
confidence and self-esteem, than non-prostitute women. See John J. Potterat et. aI., On 
Becoming a Prostitute: An Exploratory Case-Comparison Study, BRIEF REPORTS (March 
20,1984), cited SEX WORK, supra note 5, at 335. 
172. See Nash, supra note 101, at 72-73. 
tj & 
Winter 1999 FEMINISTS AND PROSTITUTES 179 
divisive and politically weak feminism. 
One way feminists can avoid conflict is by shifting the focus of 
feminism from issues of female freedom or limitation to working to reduce 
or alter conditions within which people experience oppression. 173 In 
reality, feminists want power to change these conditions. And frequently it 
is these conditions which actually cause divisions between feminists. 
Using the prostitution example, if feminists worked to eradicate the 
stigmatization and abuse of the prostitute, no conflict would exist between 
the desired goals of the prostitute and the political beliefs of the feminist. 
The prostitute would not have to rely on the nominal power found through 
stigmatization to have a voice. She might not even need to write because 
the stigma she is fighting would be gone. 
Yet in changing the focus of feminism to reduce tensions between 
feminists and to increase solidarity and political power, the question of how 
far we are willing to open up the parameters of feminism must also be 
faced. Some would argue that this Article opens feminism too far, that 
there are some topics which are inherently non-feminist or even anti-
feminist. 
However, if persuasion relies on appealing to an individual's belief 
structure, people are able to evaluate against their own beliefs "better" and 
"worse" arguments. Therefore, rather than ignore or hide from topics 
which appear at face value to be antithetical to the goals of feminism, such 
topics must be embraced. Such topics can be used to test or prove one's 
hypotheses or theories-to make one's arguments better. Such testing is, 
as demonstrated in the fIrst section of this Article, impossible under the 
feminist rhetoric of truth. Yet feminists willing to approach feminist 
jurisprudence from the inclusive stance of a theory of choice within 
constraint will be able to embrace taboo subjects and to use them as 
strengths. Ironically, by rejecting truth rhetoric, the feminist is able to test 




In this Article, an attempt has been made to demonstrate how the 
knowledge gained by contemporary feminists through listening and 
revocalizing women's voices is not an innocent truthful knowledge free 
from exclusionary power. Contemporary feminism's rhetoric of truth is 
produced by and reflects power differentials between women and between 
173. Cj. Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 
1704 (1990) (arguing to reduce double-bind situations faced by feminists by eliminating the 
social constraints causing them). 
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women and men. Rather than increase the choices and availability of 
persuasive strategies for the feminist, this rhetoric of truth has constrained 
feminist jurisprudence into falsely dichotomous schools of thought between 
choice and constraint. This forced dichotomy in turn closes the doors of 
persuasive strategy for feminism by dividing and alienating feminists and 
the very women feminism claims to represent. 
In deconstructing and destabilizing the truth of contemporary 
feminism, there becomes a way to open up the doors of feminism to 
include a new more expansive voice. This deconstruction is not a rejection 
of the contributions of either constraint or choice feminists. In fact, it is 
only through embracing the techniques and understanding of both schools 
that this opening can be seen. As feminists, we must work to increase the 
choices of all women, and encourage the increase of choice among our own 
feminist rank. But we must do so realistically, with a critical and 
challenging eye toward social, economic and strategic constraints on both 
women and feminists. Only by simultaneously challenging constraints and 
working to increase women's and feminists' choices can a complex and 
inclusive feminist theory of sexuality be developed, which simultaneously 
allows the feminist scholar to maneuver within the constraints of 
persuasion. 
Such a theory of choice and constraint will give voice to an increased 
diversity and number of women supporting feminism, which can serve as a 
strong political body lobbying for legal reform. It can provide room for a 
discourse that will work to decrease sexual assault while simultaneously 
allowing women pleasure. It can critically examine power differentials in 
society without allowing the power differentials to stifle the creativity of 
the researcher. It can allow for a feminist rhetoric with more freedom to 
avoid ignoring, or worse, betraying, a great many women's concerns. 
Yet opening the doors to a more inclusive feminism brings with it 
responsibilities. We must take responsibility for our own exercise of power 
and recognize the choices we make either to include or exclude in the name 
of strategy. This technique allows for no innocence. It pushes feminists to 
face the polemic of both trying to create an inclusive definition of 
womanhood or feminism, and yet also excluding some women or feminists 
in order to present a united front. However, by encouraging the feminist to 
desire both perfect inclusion and unity, it pushes us to try to find ways to 
dissolve or avoid divisions of women yet still remain persuasive. Thus 
encouraging the feminist to confront her own exclusions may lead to 
solutions that diminish these exclusions while retaining persuasive power. 
Ironically, this methodology, which rejects its own innocence, may lead the 
way to obtaining truly representative knowledge. 
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